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ABSTRACT 
Microfinance has become very important in global poverty reduction debates. 
The popular assumption is that enabling poor households access to credit helps 
households begin micro entrepreneurship which would enable them improve their 
incomes and eventually escape poverty. Evidence from research so far has been 
scanty, and many results have been highly contested.  
The main objective of the thesis was to analyze the impact of microfinance on 
household income as well as measure household vulnerability to poverty after 
access to microfinance. The study is an experimental case of Makueni district 
where participants in microfinance programmes and non participant households 
were studied over time; thus yielding a rich pooled data for analysis.  On 
integrating time dynamics in the analysis, the results indicate a positive and 
significant impact of microfinance on household income. To this end the thesis 
argues that there is a role of microfinance on the improvement of household 
incomes. The thesis also re asserts that providing affordable financial services to 
the rural population still remains to be an important component of development 
strategy.  
On the other hand the thesis emphasizes that there is need to come up with 
innovative microfinance institutions that are supportive of their own role in assets 
accumulation and wealth creation for their clients. This will involve innovative 
targeting of potential clients, as well as streamlined microfinance regulations to 
protect their clients. In particular the study cautions that the ability of households 
to begin informal sole micro entrepreneurships should not be assumed to be 
adequate for the improvement of household income. There is need to create a 
policy framework to spur growth not only in the micro enterprises but also in the 
overall rural economy that would lead to the creation of employment 
opportunities and an increment in the agricultural output. This is quite a big task 
to accomplish and may require more than one particular policy intervention. In 
essence this calls for both private (microfinance) and public partnerships to 
create the environment where such poverty reduction objectives could be 
realized.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Mikrofinanzierung ist in der globalen Debatte zu Armutsbekämpfung sehr wichtig 
geworden. Eine weit verbreitete Annahme ist, dass das Ermöglichen von Zugang armer 
Hauhalte zu Krediten diesen Haushalten die Möglichkeit gibt, sehr kleine Unternehmen 
zu gründen, die ihnen helfen, ihr Einkommen zu verbessern und unter Umständen der 
Armut zu entkommen. Wissenschaftliche Nachweise dessen waren bisher dürftig, und 
viele Forschungsergebnisse sind angefochten worden.  
Das Hauptziel dieser Dissertation war die Analyse des Einflusses von Mikrofinanzierung 
auf Haushaltseinkommen sowie die Untersuchung der Anfälligkeit für Armut von 
Haushalten mit Zugang zu Mikrofinanzierung. Es handelt sich um eine experimentielle 
Fallstudie im Makuemi Distrikt in Kenia, für die Teilnehmer an 
Mikrofinanzierungsprogrammen und solche, die nicht an entsprechenden Programmen 
teilnehmen, über einen bestimmten Zeitraum beobachtet wurden. Dies resultierte in 
einem umfangreichen Datenpool. Nach der Einbindung aller gesammelten Daten in die 
Analyse zeigt sich ein positiver und signifikanter (allerdings schwacher) Einfluss von 
Mikrofinanzierung auf Haushaltseinkommen. Deshalb wird in dieser Dissertation 
argumentiert, dass Mikrofinanzierung eine Rolle in der Verbesserung von 
Haushaltseinkommen spielt und die These unterstützt, dass die Bereitstellung 
bezahlbarer finanzieller Dienstleistungen für die ländliche Bevölkerung eine wichtige 
Komponente von Entwicklungsstrategien bleibt. Darüber hinaus wird festgestellt, dass 
so lange Unternehmen immer noch eine Rolle für wirtschaftliches Wachstum spielen und 
so lange  Mikrofinanzierung als Grundlage für Kleinst-Unternehmen zur Verfügung steht, 
weiterhin ein Bedarf an Mikrofinanzierung besteht.  
Andererseits soll durch die Studie hervorgehoben werden, dass es nötig ist, innovative 
Institutionen zur Mikrofinanzierung zu entwickeln, die ihrer Rolle sowohl in der eigenen 
als auch bei der Vermögensbildung ihrer Kunden gerecht werden. Dies bedingt, die 
Zielgruppe, also potenzielle Kunden, innovativ anzusprechen, aber auch, einheitliche 
Regelungen für Mikrofinanzierung festzulegen, um die Kunden zu schützen. Die Studie 
stellt insbesondere heraus, dass die Fähigkeit von Haushalten, eigenständig informelle 
Kleinstunternehmen zu starten, nicht als alleiniger Garant für eine Verbesserung der 
Haushaltseinkommen gesehen werden kann.  
Die Schaffung von politischen Rahmenbedingungen, die Wachstum nicht nur im Bereich 
der Kleinstunternehmen sondern auch allgemein die Wirtschaft im ländlichen Raum 
fördern, würde zur Schaffung von Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten und zur Erhöhung der 
landwirtschaftlichen Leistungsfähigkeit führen. Das ist eine große Aufgabe, die es zu 
erfüllen gilt. Möglicherweise bedarf es mehr als eines speziellen politischen Eingriffes. 
Im Endeffekt sind Private(Mikrofinanzierung)–Public-Partnerships gefragt, um eine 
Umgebung zu schaffen, in der Armutsbekämpfungsziele umgesetzt werden können.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. General Introduction to the Study 
The word microfinance is being used very often in development vocabulary today. 
Although the word is literally comprised of two words: micro and finance which literally 
mean small credit; the concept of microfinance goes beyond the provision of small credit 
to the poor. Christen (1997) defines microfinance as  'the means of providing a variety of 
financial services to the poor based on market-driven and commercial approaches' 
(Christen R.P., 1997)1. This definition encompasses provision of other financial services 
like savings, money transfers, payments, remittances, and insurance, among others.  
However many microfinance practices today still focus on micro-credit: providing the 
poor with small credit with the hope of improving their labour productivity and thereby 
lead to increment in household incomes. 
 
Joint liability lending (JLL) which is the main focus of this study is the sort of 
microfinance model that is targeted to the very poor in society who can not even borrow 
individually but must borrow within a group of other borrowers. Participants of joint 
liability lending must organize themselves in groups, and act as security for each others 
loans. In reality, the group not the individual is responsible for loan repayment to the 
microfinance institution. The groups use peer pressure and peer monitoring to ensure that 
loans acquired by members are repaid. This study is mainly focused on participation and 
access to loans by the poor through Joint Liability Lending microfinance programs. The 
main interests of the study was to understand how members organized themselves in to 
borrowing groups; and how these groups operated as institutions, facilitating household 
access to credit. It was also the interest of this study to understand how households used 
the credit, and to measure the impact of that credit on household income.  
                                                 
1
 Thus going by this formal definition, it is clear that the industry is not limited to the NGO MFIs but also 
include other institutions like financial co-operatives, ROSCAs, Savings Associations/Clubs, some welfare 
associations etc. 
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1.1.1 The current global Perception of microfinance 
In the global arena there is already the impression that microfinance is successful in 
reducing poverty. Many policy makers are therefore engaged on how to make 
microfinance sustainable and available to many poor households in the future. Many 
stake holders in the microfinance industry especially donors and investors argue that, 
“Microfinance can pay for itself, and must do so if it is to reach very large numbers of 
poor households” (CGAP). The overall message in this argument is that unless 
microfinance providers charge enough to cover their costs, they will always be limited by 
the scarce and uncertain supply of subsidies from governments and donors. The main 
underlying assumption in this argument is that microfinance is already good for the 
clients, and therefore what is really urgent is to make the financial service available to as 
many poor people as possible. Morduch (2000) correctly points out that this kind of 
enthusiasm for microfinance rests on an enticing win-win proposition that: Microfinance 
institutions that follow the principles of good banking will also be the ones that alleviate 
the most poverty. The assumption being that with good banking practices it is possible to 
cover costs and operate in a sustainable manner to continue serving clients and alleviating 
poverty (Morduch 2000).   
 
The “win-win” situation both for the investor and the poor can be explained as follows: 
The investor in microfinance programs follows good banking practices with the 
possibility of some profit, while the poor continue to benefit by accessing reliable credit 
that is assumed to be beneficial to their welfare. The supporters of the “win- win” 
proposition stress (mainly by assumption) that the ability to repay loans by the poor is a 
good indicator that whatever investments the poor make with their micro credit loans 
must be giving back profits. Given the assumption that microfinance is already beneficial 
to the poor, the “win-win” proposition further assumes that the amount of household 
poverty reduced is directly proportional to the number of households reached with 
microfinance. The “win-win” vision has been translated in to a series of “best practices” 
circulated widely by a number of key donors including the Consultative Group to Assist 
the Poorest (CGAP). CGAP is a consortium of NGOs hosted at the World Bank. Other 
donor organizations that embrace “best practice microfinance” include, United States 
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Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations Development 
programme (UNDP) among other key donors.  It is important to note that the proposal of 
a commercial approach to microfinance for the poor has been questioned by socially 
oriented service providers. Especially the assumptions underlying the “win-win” 
proposition have raised eye brows among socially oriented service providers who 
question the validity of such assumptions in the real world.  
 
1.1.2 The microfinance hype 
The 1997 Microfinance Summit called for the mobilization 0f $20 billion over a 10 year 
period to support microfinance. The United Nations proclaimed 2005 as the “Year of 
Micro-credit” while 2006 went a score higher to award a Nobel Peace Prize to the largely 
acclaimed founder of modern microfinance: Prof. Muhamad Yunus and the Bank he 
founded in the 1970s: the Grameen Bank. The recent publicity accorded microfinance 
potentially creates an image of an institution that is all success, thus lacking critique. To 
justify such significant hype and investment in the name of poverty reduction compared 
to other alternative investments for the same cause in other programs; it is important that 
the proposition that “microfinance reaches and helps the poor most” be proven and not 
just assumed.  
 
Until very recently much of the enthusiasm about the positive impact of microfinance had 
been a matter of assumption. Most of the excitement was based on the great stories on the 
benefits and success of microfinance that have been told from around the globe and have 
gone a long way to turn microfinance from a few scattered programs in to a global 
movement. For example, there are the ever repeated stories of women and their families 
living at the verge of poverty and desperation, then eventually the lives of the household 
members take a turn for the better once these women are given the opportunity to access 
credit. The women usually do not get in to very sophisticated enterprises but rather they 
may buy some yarn and other sawing supplies, or start any other such humble business 
venture, and they are already off in to a route course that will see their households lifted 
out of poverty and can afford better nutrition, health and education for their children. 
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Aghion and Morduch (2005), observe that great anecdotes like these should not be 
substitutes for careful statistical investigations; there is need to have statistical 
information if indeed the success stories generally apply to most of the microfinance 
clients across the board. It is important to understand that these great stories are generally 
meant to illustrate the potential of microfinance while statistical investigations and 
analysis are meant to show typical impacts across the board. To many policy makers and 
donors, anecdotes like the ones described above, coupled with the fact that poor client are 
able to borrow and repay imply that whatever investments that the poor are involved in 
are good enough and therefore benefiting them.  
1.1.3 Recent Studies and the Current Research Problem 
Rigorous empirical analysis in the issue of statistical impact of microfinance began in the 
1990s. The studies so far remain few and the results of these studies are highly 
provocative. The first school of thought questions the relevance of microfinance as a 
poverty reducing policy in the first place.  (Adam & Von Pische, 1992) argued that “debt 
is not an effective tool for helping most poor people to enhance their economic condition 
be they operators of small farms or micro entrepreneurs”. The main argument of Adam 
and Von Pische (1992) is that there are other more important constraints that face small 
agricultural households and they include product prices, land tenure, technology, market 
access and risk. Also in support of the same view is Gulli (1998) who argues that credit is 
not always the main constraint for micro enterprises´ growth and development, and that 
poor people demand a wide range of financial, business development and social services 
for different business and household purposes. In a close rejoinder Mayoux (2002) argues 
that the logical assumption of virtuous spiral2 of economic empowerment to the 
household due to microfinance does not in reality exist. This is particularly so given that 
there exists gender relations in society in relation to loan uses; a scenario that more often 
that not leaves poor women borrowers highly indebted, and not much wealth to show for 
it (Mayoux 2002).  
                                                 
2
 Virtuous spiral of economic well being refer to the positive chain of economic wellbeing that is assumed 
to originate from access to credit by a poor household. For example, access to micro credit may lead to 
micro entrepreneurship, leading to increase in household income, leading to increased household demand 
for goods and services and the alleviation of poverty.  
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Rigorous studies have shown that micro entrepreneurs below the poverty line experience 
lower percentage income increases after borrowing than those above the poverty line. 
Studies have also demonstrated that households below the poverty line tend to use the 
loans for consumption purposes to a greater extent than households above the poverty 
line; thus their income should be expected to increase less (Gulli 1998).  Research 
findings that poor households are likely to use micro credit loans for consumption  
purposes yet their loan repayments rates are higher than repayment rates for the formal 
financial institution, which are normally used by the well off in society (Ghatak et al 
1999) is quite intriguing.   
As though to counter the negative arguments against the impact of microfinance on 
poverty reduction, other studies have found that microfinance is relevant to poverty 
reduction not just for the beneficiaries but also there are positive spill over effects to the 
rest of the community (Khandker 2006). In his study Khandker (2006) uses a panel 
household survey from Bangladesh and observes that access to microfinance contributes 
to poverty reduction, especially for female participants, and to the overall poverty 
reduction at the village level. Pitt and Khandker (1998) find, using data from three 
programs in rural Bangladesh, that borrowing from group-lending schemes increased 
consumption of poor households. However, Morduch 1998b has argued that Pitt and 
Khandker’s result reflect program selection effects rather than the impact of borrowing 
per se. 
There are also other studies that seem to support to some extent the relevance of 
microfinance in poverty reduction. Morduch (1999) argues that microfinance has had 
positive impact on poverty reduction. However he is keen to add that “Even in the best of 
circumstances, credit from microfinance programs helps fund self employment activities 
that most often supplement income for borrowers rather than drive fundamental shifts in 
employment patterns. It (microfinance) rarely generates new jobs for others and success 
has been especially limited in regions with highly seasonal income patterns and low 
population densities (Morduch 1999)”.  
 
Other similar studies have shown that microfinance may be relevant for poverty 
reduction, but does not reach the poorest as often claimed. The results from these studies 
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have identified beneficial impacts to the “active poor” but argue that microfinance does 
not assist the poorest as it is often claimed mainly because it does not reach them (Hulme 
and Mosley, 1996, Sharma 2000, Kiiru and Mburu, 2007). This group of studies often 
report mixed results suggesting the possibility of both positive and negative impacts for 
different households.  Coleman (2006) found that microfinance programs have a positive 
impact on the richer households but the impact is insignificant to the other poorer 
households. In Coleman’s (2006) study, richer households were able to commandeer 
larger loans to themselves because they sat in influential positions in the village banks as 
committee members. Coleman (2006) argued that it is the size of loans that households 
were able to acquire that was very important in determining the impact of those loans in 
household incomes. In the same study, many poor women borrowers dropped out of the 
borrowing programs citing the size of loans as too small to make any significant 
investments that that can significantly improve their incomes. In his study of Bolivia’s 
Bancosol, Mosley (1996) reports that in any given cohort roughly 25 % showed 
spectacular gains to borrowing , 60-65% stayed about the same, and 10 to 15% went 
bankrupt (Mosley 1996). Kiriti, (2005) argues that microfinance tends to indebt too poor 
women leaving them more vulnerable and exposed. In the study, Kiriti (2005) 
concentrates on the impact of microfinance repayment on household assets. The findings 
are that poor households depleted livelihood assets in the course of loan repayment since 
the income generating activities were not raising enough profits to repay the loans on 
time.  
Aghion and Morduch 2005, observe that microfinance can make a real difference in the 
lives of those served, but microfinance is neither a panacea nor a magic bullet against 
poverty, and it can not be expected to work every where and for every one.  Much as 
there have been mixed statistical impacts of microfinance, there also has been no widely 
acclaimed study that robustly shows strong impacts, but many studies suggest the 
possibility of good welfare impact (Aghion and Morduch 2005). More research should 
therefore be directed towards not just specific results but also the context within which 
particular results are expected. What worked in a particular socio cultural and economic 
context may not necessarily work the same if the socio cultural and economic conditions 
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are changed in another context. This kind of focus for future research will contribute 
more to knowledge, for the purposes of policy.   
 
It is within this background that this study is conducted. Specifically the study focuses on 
the impact of microfinance on poor rural households´ income, and household’s future 
vulnerability to poverty. To achieve this the study keenly focuses on household 
participation and access to credit through Joint Liability Lending (JLL) programs, 
household credit (cash) allocation and subsequent loan repayment. There is a special 
reason why the study chose to concentrate on joint liability lending programs other than 
other models of microfinance. This is because joint liability lending model targets the 
much poorer population. Poverty reduction is clearly spelled out in many of the 
objectives of such microfinance models. Not all microfinance institutions have poverty 
reduction as a primary mission. The microfinance industry today consists of a wide range 
of institutions serving different market niches with the sole aim of providing small scale 
financial services to businesses and households traditionally kept outside the financial 
system; without necessarily having a poverty reduction mission. 
 
In particular there are four main objectives of the thesis. All the objectives are closely 
interrelated if we were to have a systematic understanding of the impact of microfinance 
on household’s incomes and household future vulnerability to poverty. To this end, there 
is need to really understand the attributes of the households that participate in these 
programs. This will help us to understand whether it is really the poor households that 
participate or not, there is also need to understand why the households need the loans 
along the objectives of the lending institution. Finally it is also important to know the 
impact of the loans on household incomes as well as the participants´ future vulnerability 
to poverty.  The objectives of this study could be formally spelled out as follows.   
1.2 Study objectives  
The general objective of the study was to analyze the impact of microfinance on 
household income and household future vulnerability to poverty. To achieve this there 
are four specific objectives:  
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 (1) To understand the socioeconomic attributes of households that participate in the Joint 
Liability Lending  microfinance programs 
(2) To understand what determines household decisions for the loan sizes that they 
acquire.  
 (3) To analyse the impact of microfinance on household income using both cross 
sectional and pooled data. 
(4) To investigate if participation in microfinance programs significantly reduces 
household vulnerability to poverty.  
  
Another very important research questions was: How do joint liability groups operate to 
ensure high loan repayment rates? Understanding this question was expected to shed light 
on the resulting impact of microfinance on household incomes and vulnerability to 
poverty.   
1.2.1 Study hypothesis 
Our study hypothesis include  
(i) Microfinance has had a significant positive impact on household income 
(ii) Participation in Microfinance programs significantly reduces household 
vulnerability to poverty.  
(iii) Joint liability lending institutions attract the poorest of society 
  
1.3 Overview of Research methodology 
To address the empirical objectives of the study, primary data was collected in 3 cross 
sections within Makueni district Kenya. The data was collected for the same households 
after every six months for a period of 18 months; thus giving us a rich pooled primary 
data for analysis. The data was collected using questionnaires that focused on household 
access to microfinance, household uses of the credit, as well as fluctuations of household 
income over the period. To achieve a more accurate data about household incomes and 
expenditure and also to be able to capture any changes including marginal changes over 
the relatively short period, we used relative measures of income and poverty. These 
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measures mainly focused on household access and ownership of assets, and the 
fluctuations therein within the period.  
 
The overall study is designed as an experimental case study. A randomised sample of 200 
treatment households (participants of Microfinance programs) and 200 control 
households (non participants of microfinance programs) in every cross section was used. 
Data in this study is analysed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques.  
 
1.4. Organisation of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter two reviews the current issues of 
microfinance that are especially relevant for understanding its impact. The chapter begins 
by highlighting to the reader the plight of rural households in developing countries. In 
particular the chapter discusses how rural household are caught up in dire poverty, and 
how labour - the biggest asset of the poor ceases to be productive. The first section of the 
chapter sets the stage for the microfinance intervention.  
 
Once the stage has been set, the next section discusses further the potential role of 
microfinance in fighting rural poverty. In particular the section argues that as long as 
microfinance has a potential to restore productivity to poor peoples’ labour; be it by 
enabling purchase of farm inputs or direct entrepreneurship, then it has a role to play in 
poverty reduction. The chapter does not end here as it may be expected; rather the next 
sections discuss the practical issues that policy makers have had to deal with in trying to 
provide financial services to the poor. The thesis discusses the earlier policies of credit 
subsidization to rural households and why they eventually failed. “Modern microfinance” 
is then introduced in to the picture by tracing its humble beginnings in the early 1970s in 
Bangladesh. The re-entry of modern microfinance restored hope in reaching the poor 
with financial services; especially after the collapse of subsidized credit.   
 
The sections that follow discuss the rise in popularity of microfinance programs. In 
particular there is a keen interest on the current global publicity and the image given to 
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the role of microfinance in poverty reduction. There is also the opinion that the current 
global projection and publicity accorded to microfinance has almost overshadowed any 
other poverty alleviation policy. The thesis proposes that there is need to prove 
empirically some of the assumptions surrounding the high level publicity accorded to 
microfinance as a way of informing policy. Chapter Two is the chapter that mainly 
motivate the need for impact measurement which is the central focus of the thesis. 
 
Chapter three is mainly a theoretical chapter dealing with conceptual and methodological 
issues. In particular the chapter conceptualises rural poverty and bring in microfinance as 
an intervention policy for the alleviation of rural poverty. Given the study context there is 
an attempt to justify why relative measures of poverty and income have been preferred 
other than the absolute measures. The general methodologies of measuring the impact of 
microfinance as they have been previously applied by earlier researchers have also been 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter four which is the longest chapter in the thesis mainly produces results and 
discussions. The chapter begins with a rich qualitative analysis mainly focussing on the 
JLL groups as institutions and how households are organised and transact within the 
institution. The practical issues of loan acquisitions, usage and repayment, are discussed 
here. Group formations and activities are also discussed in some details. The qualitative 
section mainly generates hypothesis as opposed to hypothesis testing and helps 
understand the quantitative results as later analysed. The qualitative analysis is followed 
by a rigorous quantitative analysis. There are four sections in the quantitative analysis 
section corresponding to the four main objectives of the study. The first section analyses 
the determinants of household participation in microfinance JLL programs. The main 
result is that joint liability lending microfinance programs attract the relatively poor in 
society though the poorest may not participate due to selection biases in group 
formations. The second section analyses the determinants of household decisions in to 
loan choices. The results indicate that pre existing household income, as well as dynamic 
incentives by the microfinance institution are very important determinants of the loan size 
that a household receives from the microfinance institution. In the third section we 
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measure the impact of microfinance on household income. The results are mixed. After 
controlling for selection and endogeneity biases, cross sectional analysis fails to show 
any positive significant impact of microfinance on household income. However on 
pooling the data and still controlling for selection and endogeneity biases, we find even 
more interesting results. In the initial period after household access to credit we find 
overall insignificant impact of the credit on household income; with possibility of 
negative impacts to some households. However in the later period (after 18 months) of 
household participation in microfinance programmes there is a positive significant impact 
of microfinance on household income. In the fourth and the last section of the 
quantitative analysis we deal with the question whether participation in microfinance 
programs significantly reduce household vulnerability to poverty. The main result is that 
participation in joint liability lending microfinance programs does not significantly 
increase household vulnerability to poverty neither does access to microfinance loans 
significantly reduce household vulnerability to poverty.  
 
Each of the four quantitative analysis sections begins with a short introduction to the 
problem; then the methodology used for the analysis is discussed in details; followed by 
the results and discussion. At the end of all the quantitative analysis there are some 
general concluding remarks to the section. An important policy implication that arises in 
the analysis is that market oriented microfinance programs may not be the policy of 
choice for reaching out to very poor households.  In the first place the very poor 
households may not be selected to participate due to selection biases in group formations. 
Even when some poor households get selected by their peers they are likely to use the 
loans for consumption purposes and are likely to deplete their household assets in the 
course of loan repayment.  
 
Normally the thesis would have more or less ended after chapter four. Ending the thesis 
there would have only served to fuel the already hot debate in the international arena 
about the effectiveness of microfinance in poverty reduction.  Given the importance of 
the policy questions involved in the thesis, it was generally felt that there is a need to 
actively participate in shaping future research in an attempt to find a more or less 
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conclusive policy action framework for microfinance and poverty reduction. Chapter five 
motivates future research in the area by proposing a theoretical propagation of how 
microfinance would fit in the bigger picture of rural development and poverty reduction.  
The goal of the chapter is mainly to generate hypothesis; but empirical research in the 
future would be useful to generate conclusive information.  Theoretically the chapter 
demonstrates that high concentrations of informal entrepreneurships within a locality may 
not necessarily be a sign of economic empowerment of the households; Rather it could as 
well indicate a non performing economy, or that that there are many bottleneck to the 
formalisation of enterprises.  
 
Chapter six concludes the thesis and discusses key policy implications. In particular there 
is the conclusion that providing affordable financial services to the rural population still 
remains to be an important component of development strategy. On the other hand there 
is need to come up with innovative microfinance institutions that are supportive of their 
own role in assets accumulation and wealth creation for their clients. This will involve 
innovative targeting of potential clients, as well as streamlined microfinance conditions to 
protect the clients.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF CURENT ISSUES OF MICROFINANCE AND HOW THEY 
RELATE TO IMPACT ON RURAL HOUSEHOLDS INCOMES 
2.1 Rural Poverty: A Challenge to the Provision of Financial Services 
About 1.3 million people of the world live with less than one dollar a day (World Bank). 
About half of the world’s people (nearly three billion people) live on less than two dollars 
a day. The total wealth of the world’s three richest individuals is greater than the 
combined gross domestic product of the 48 poorest countries; (about a quarter of the 
entire world states (Ignacio 1998). Little wonder that poverty and inequalities have 
become global concerns. Poverty can be generally defined as the inability to attain a 
certain predetermined minimum level of consumption at which basic needs of a society 
or country are assumed to be satisfied. The core concept of this general definition of 
poverty is the fact that to be poor is defined by access to basic goods and services like 
food, shelter, healthcare and education. The food concept in this definition goes beyond 
just food passé but also includes clean water and sanitation services.  
 
Given this definition it is not surprising at all that in Kenya poverty is mainly a rural 
phenomena while urban poverty is mainly concentrated in slums3  and other informal 
dwellings. About 65 % of Kenyans live in the rural areas deriving their livelihoods 
mainly from agriculture. However over the years the subsistence agriculture sector has 
continued to suffer declining productivity. The declining agricultural production for small 
scale farmers has to a large extent been caused by erratic rainfall since most of the 
subsistence agricultural productivity in Kenya is rain fed. However, on the other hand 
even when the rural areas receive a reasonable amount of rainfall peasant farmers who 
form majority of farmers still have to content with low yields and food insecurity due to 
lack of proper or non utilization of farm inputs to enhance productivity and also lack of 
proper storage and preservation of farm produce. Low agricultural production has serious 
                                                 
3
 The concept of slum in Kenya refers to informal urban settlements characterized by congestion, lack of 
electricity, water and sanitation facilities. Many slum dwellers comprise the unemployed or lowly paid 
urban workers otherwise know as the “working poor”. 
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implication on welfare not only in terms of food insecurity but also in terms of lost 
incomes thereby leading to inability to afford social services like health care and 
education. The effect of this decline has been lost incomes, food insecurity and 
widespread poverty. The poor constitute slightly more than half the population of Kenya, 
and three quarters of these poor population lives in the rural areas. Women constitute the 
majority of the poor and also the absolute majority of Kenyans (GOK 2003).  
 
Many public policies in the recent times have been focused towards poverty reduction, 
finding ways to improve household productivity and thereby incomes. Apparently the 
thinking that rural poverty is a consequent of liquidity constraints has not changed much 
since independence. More than ever before, policy makers in Kenya believe that 
empowering the poor with financial resources may be the key to their economic 
empowerment. Since the 1960s and 70s, there have been policies on the role of 
microfinance in the rural development process.  These policies focused on the provision 
of agricultural credit as a necessary support to the introduction of new, more productive 
agricultural technologies that would ensure that farmers improve their incomes and feed 
the nation (Moll 2005). Given the argument that labor productivity could be unleashed by 
removing or reducing the liquidity constraints, the approach to micro credit broadened to 
include individuals involved in both small and micro- enterprises like handcrafts and 
home based business. The following figure explains the general perception of the poor 
emphasizing on the interlink to low productivity within the vicious cycle of poverty,  
 
 
Figure 1: the poor are held up in a vicious cycle of poverty:  
Low labour 
productivity 
Low incomes 
Low household 
demand for goods 
and services 
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2.2 The Role of Microfinance in Fighting Rural Poverty  
The forgoing figure has that household labor, which is an important household resource, 
becomes unproductive4 due to different constraints including a liquidity constraint. As 
already discussed, many governments and donor communities believe that the liquidity 
constraint is the most important constraint impeding poor households and that if it is 
addressed it will be possible for households to escape poverty. Economists argue that to 
break the vicious cycle of poverty, there needs to be an outside force that will intervene at 
some point of the cycle to improve demand for goods and services. This could be done by 
injecting some liquidity that is believed to unleash the productivity of household labour. 
Microfinance promises not only to break the vicious chain of poverty by injecting 
liquidity in to the vicious chain, but also it promises to initiate a whole new cycle of 
virtuous spirals of self enforcing economic empowerment that lead to increased 
household well-being. Figure two is illustrates the microfinance promise.  
                                                 
4
 Imagine a household that depends on tilling the farm for subsistence. Without the ability to afford farm 
inputs, the household’s  labour could be very unproductive and the yields per hectare could be small. 
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Figure 2: Microfinance promise 
 
Such is the model that has promoted the microfinance institution and given it the “polite 
and respectable” image it currently enjoys. There are several assumptions that go with 
this model; first it is assumed that poor people can become micro-entrepreneurs if only 
they were given a chance through credit. In essence this implies that the level of 
entrepreneurship and managerial skills required is already given or can be easily acquired 
Unlocking household labour that had been locked up due to liquidity 
constraints 
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by the poor. The model further assumes that there is a vibrant market for goods and 
services and that it is possible for micro-entrepreneurs to get linked up to markets for 
their products. Lastly some proponents of the model also assume that the fact that the 
poor can repay at market interest rates or slightly above market rates is a good indication 
that they are improving their financial status; and therefore it is a sign of good impact of 
microfinance. The irony of the this assumption being that even before the microfinance 
revolution many governments and non governmental organisations believed that informal 
money lenders were exploiting the poor by charging high interest rates; and that is why it 
was justified to bring to the poor a cheaper alternative; yet the poor were still paying for 
the money lender services.  
 
The forgoing are the assumptions upon which the “microfinance promise” of poverty 
reduction and economic empowerment stands. If any of the assumptions does not hold 
true in any given context then the whole promise stands compromised and the potential of 
microfinance as a poverty reduction policy may not be realised. It is very important for 
policy makers to realize that the issue of how and when poverty can be reduced through 
microfinance depends among other things on whether and how successfully microfinance 
programs address the real constraints faced by the poor in a certain context.  Making 
good use of microfinance in the task of reducing poverty requires understanding both the 
strengths and limitations pf micro credit and recognizing that other tools and measures 
are needed to complement it (Gulli, 1998).  
 
2.3  Lending to the Poor and the Challenges to Overcome  
Diminishing marginal returns to capital suggest that enterprises with relatively little 
capital should be able to earn higher marginal returns from an extra unit of capital 
invested than enterprises that already have a great deal of capital. This is derived from the 
strict concavity of the production function as illustrated in figure 3. Due to the same 
concept of the strictly concave production function it would be the case that poorer 
entrepreneurs have a greater return on their next unit of capital than the richer 
entrepreneur and therefore the poorer entrepreneur would be willing to pay higher interest 
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rate per extra unit of capital. This kind of logic offers a partial explanation to why 
microfinance interest rates are high and provides a rational case for the removal of usury 
rules in order to set interest rates that reflect not only the ability to pay but also the risk of 
dealing with poorer borrowers.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:   Marginal returns to capital with concave production function.   
Source: De Aghion and Morduch (2005) 
 
The principle of diminishing returns to capital in essence means that small 
undercapitalized entreprises are expected to have higher marginal returns from extra units 
of capital investment in their enterprises and therefore their ability to pay higher interest 
rates per unit of capital ceteris paribus should be unquestionable. If this were the case, 
then it would be logical to expect ceteris paribus that banks would naturally lend to these 
groups of entrepreneurs not only out of social concerns but also out of the good business 
prospects.  
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The reality of issues is however very different. Poor entrepreneurs have for a long                                                            
time been isolated by formal credit institutions. The common perception of poor micro 
entrepreneurs is that they are risky and too costly to lend to. De Aghion and Morduch 
(2005) argue that the problems of lending to the poor has been aggravated by information 
asymmetries, and usury laws such that banks can not use appropriate interest rates to 
compensate for the risks and higher costs.  Trying to deal with problems originating from 
information asymmetry may lead to other problems like credit rationing, adverse 
selection and moral hazard. These problems are not necessarily confined to the informal 
financial institutions but they also affect the formal financial institutions.  
2.3.1 Credit rationing  
Access to credit does not imply that the demand for credit will be satisfied. Lenders 
determine how much credit is allocated to clients based on the probability of loan default, 
often resulting in credit rationing. Credit rationing in this sense refers to the inability for 
financial institutions to grant as much loans as may be demanded by the clients based on 
a set of criteria. The probability of default may be influenced by a number of factors that 
include the expected returns of the project, the terms of the loan, market imperfections 
and borrower characteristics. If the expected return is less than the principal loan amount 
plus interest (the terms of the loan), then the probability of default will be high. In such a 
scenario, the optimal lender's decision will be either to ration the borrower by granting a 
smaller amount than originally applied for or to completely reject the loan application.   
 
2.3.2 Adverse selection 
Information asymmetry in credit markets arises because borrowers have better 
information about their potential risk of default than the lenders. Lenders may choose to 
increase the lending rate (interest rates) to compensate for the higher cost of information 
gathering or the level of reliability of the information. Also in many instances in the 
financial institutions interest rate may play the role of a screening device where 
Investments with high returns may attract lower interest rates than investments with 
lower returns as the lenders anticipate default rates based on business returns. This may 
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lead to the problem of adverse selection. Adverse selection occurs when borrowers with 
safe (and low default risk) projects decide to opt out of the credit market in the face of 
rising interest rates, while more risky projects with potential higher returns but with 
higher probability of default are attracted into the market (Okurut et al 2004).  
 
Studies have shown that imperfect information may disable interest rates from playing 
their classical market-clearing role (Baydas et al. 1994: 280). Information asymmetries 
are more complicated in informal credit markets because of the fact that the credit 
histories of borrowers are not documented and pooled. Given the huge number of 
prospective clients in the informal financial institutions, the cost of acquiring this 
information is prohibitively high, both in terms of time and financial resources. The other 
complication is its reliability. If lenders try to collect such information from the potential 
borrowers themselves, borrowers are likely to give an exaggerated view of their 
creditworthiness.  
 
2.3.3 Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard in the formal financial institutions could also arise as lenders try to deal 
with the problem of information asymmetry by manipulating interest rates so that they 
reflect the true costs of information gathering and reliability. A rise in the lending rate 
may create a moral hazard problem, where in order to compete for loans, borrowers with 
low risk projects shift to high risk projects that promise higher returns but with high 
probability of default.  
 
To solve the problem of moral hazard by the formal financial institutions, lenders faced 
with information asymmetry and lack of control over actions of borrowers tend to design 
credit contracts that will induce borrowers to take actions that enhance the likelihood of 
repayment and also attract low risk borrowers. The lenders may therefore find it optimal 
to charge lower than equilibrium interest rates and use non-price mechanisms like 
collateral to ration credit (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990: 238). The use of collateral will mean 
that poor people who may have the potential to invest in a viable project will not be able 
to access credit from formal financial intuitions because they may lack collateral. Also 
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the poor may also need credit for other non investments uses, but as long as they have no 
collateral then they will be shunned by the forma financial institutions.  
 
Given the forgoing problems facing both the formal and the informal markets, the 
fundamental question is: how can we understand the reality of credit markets, and what 
kinds of interventions are required to realize the predictions of the concave production 
function? This would be useful in devising policies that make it rational that in reality the 
poor get financial services and indeed their enterprises have higher returns per unit of 
capital. 
 
 Roodman and Quresh (2006) argue that the need for the poor to borrow and save is 
greater than the need for such services by the better off people. This is because the 
incomes of the poor are tight and often volatile, thus financial markets that help them fill 
these gaps are a matter of survival. Their argument boils down to the same conclusion 
that in commercial terms there is a market for microfinance, however the challenges are 
immense. According to Roodman and Qureshi (2006) the real genius in microfinance is 
about the ability to find a suite of techniques in product design and management that 
solve the fundamental problems of controlling costs, building volume, keeping repayment 
rates high and preventing fraud all while operating with poor people.   
 
2.4  Earlier credit market Interventions by Government subsides 
The role of Microfinance in development is demonstrated through the crucial role that 
savings and credit play in economic growth. The idea that financial structure and output 
determination are interrelated can be traced to the earliest work in financial sector-
economic growth done by Schumpeter (1959) who argued that financial services are 
paramount in promoting economic growth and that one ‘can only become an entrepreneur 
by previously becoming a debtor’. Little wonder that when low income economies 
attempted to develop their economies after World War II, rural finance emerged as a big 
concern. Large state agricultural banks were given the responsibility of allocating funds 
with the hope that by availing subsidized credit, farmers would be induced to irrigate, 
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apply fertilizers and adopt new crop varieties and technologies. The aim was to increase 
land productivity, increase labor demand and their by increase agricultural wages 
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005). 
This was the early micro credit practice which was a reaction to sound theory that in 
order to improve output in the rural areas, farmers needed credit for them to increase 
output. Since the farmers were poor, the credit had to be below the market rates to make 
it affordable. For example India’s Integrated Rural Development program tried to allocate 
credit according to social targets, where by 30 % of loans targeted members from a 
scheduled tribe or caste and another 30 % targeted women. Governments operated on 
well thought of plans of capital allocation in order to deliberately target specific groups of 
borrowers (Aghion and Morduch 2005).  
 
From a social point of view this is a good thing to do and it makes good sense to 
deliberately target weaker sectors of the economy to catalyze growth. If poor households 
were to access credit it would be possible to generate high incomes by starting small 
micro enterprises or simply being able to adopt more profitable and more productive 
agricultural practices. To realize the dream of lending to the poor, earlier credit market 
interventions had to focus on the now familiar set of three constraints: The first is high 
transactions cost per loan when lending at small scales.  The second is determining the 
risk of potential borrowers and monitoring the progress of clients which is particularly 
difficult when clients are poor and in the informal sector, and the third is that many low 
income households lack assets and collateral. In order to address these constraints, 
governments took it upon themselves to subsidize bank loans to poor households, thus 
providing the banks with incentives to lend to the poor. This was a purely social mission 
and interest rates had to be kept low. Heavy subsidies were deployed to compensate the 
banks for entering in to markets where they feared taking huge losses due to high 
transactions costs and inherent risks. Government subsidies were used to keep interest 
rates low in order to make credit affordable by poor borrowers.  
 
Providing loans below the market rates is in essence a distortion to the credit markets. 
Interest rates are ideally a way of credit rationing such that only those with viable 
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projects are the ones willing to pay for it. Given subsidies the cost of credit is driven 
below market rates and the rationing is likely to break down creating an   excess demand 
for loans. When interest rates are not allowed to reflect the costs of financial 
intermediation due to government subsidies, wealth and political power are likely to 
replace profitability as the basis of loan allocation (Aghion and Morduch 2005) and this 
did happen in many states. Many writers argue that even with subsidized credit, the poor 
rural small scale farmers were excluded from the credit markets (Morduch 2000). The 
end result was high costs of state backed banks and little benefit for the indented 
beneficiaries (Khandker et al 1993).  
 
Diverting loans to wealthier persons may not have been necessarily a bad thing to do. 
From efficiency point of view, efficiency is only achieved if loans are given to those who 
can invest them wisely and get the most returns out of them. It is not efficient to give 
loans to simply anybody based on their socio economic background, because then returns 
from investments may not be maximized. In reality, the major problems with the state 
backed programmes arose because of the political nature that surrounded state backed 
loans. Many borrowers especially the rich and well politically connected individuals 
defaulted and soon most borrowers were defaulting. This led to pressure that government 
forgive the loans especially before elections. Braverman and Guasch (1986) conclude that 
credit default rates in countries within Africa, Middle east, Latin America, South Asia, 
and South East Asia ended up with default rates of between 40 to 95%. The programs 
either ran out of money or they drained government accounts (Morduch 2000). Not 
surprising that subsidized credit failed almost universally. Experts argue that the costs of 
government subsidies were so high that they nearly swamped whatever economic 
benefits realized: if any (Khandker et al 1993). It is credible to argue that the failure of 
subsidized credit hinges on the failure to account for the incentives that could arise out 
the fungibility of loans and the politics associated with government subsidies that channel 
direct funds to the citizens. This led to a situation where by rural financial markets were 
highly distorted creating monopolies and removing market tests (Aghion and Morduch 
2005). The general end feeling was that poor rural households would have been better off 
without the subsidies. McKinnon (1973) argued that government restrictions on the 
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banking system (financial repression) restrain the quality and quantity of investment and 
therefore economic development. 
 
2.5 The Microfinance Revolution 
The real genius in microfinance is about the ability to find a suite of techniques in 
product design and management that solve the fundamental problems of controlling costs, 
building volume, keeping repayment rates high and preventing fraud all while operating 
with poor people (Roodman and Qureshi 2006). Microfinance institutions have to find 
suitable solutions to the same set of now familiar constraints if they are to deliver 
financial services to the poor: They must address the challenge of high transactions cost 
per loan when lending at small scales.  Second, they must find a way to determine the 
risk of potential borrowers and monitor the progress of poor clients in the informal sector; 
and thirdly, they must find away to deal with the lack of collateral in order to minimize 
risks.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Perhaps the best known story in microfinance is that of Mohammed Yunus, the founder 
of the Grameen Bank that has inspired many other microfinance institutions world wide. 
The Grameen Bank started during the aftermath of the country’s war of independence.  
During this time Bangladesh was plagued by desperate poverty that was made worse by 
very high birth rates. The economy was still very rural, coupled by a government that was 
perceived to be weak and corrupt.  
 
In order to deal with the poverty situation, there was a strong preference for non 
bureaucratic ‘grass roots’ and other collective approaches. This prompted the formation 
of self help groups for equally disadvantaged groups in order to pool resources for mutual 
benefit of the group members. It was in this environment that Muhammad Yunus, an 
Economics professor at the University of Chittagong, began an experimental research 
project providing credit to the rural poor of Bangladesh.  He began by lending little 
money from his pocket and realised that it was enough for villagers to run simple 
business activities like rice husking and bamboo weaving. He later found that borrowers 
were not only benefiting greatly by accessing the loans but they were also repaying 
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reliably even though they could offer no collateral.  Later with the support of the Central 
Bank of Bangladesh and donor support, that humble experiment developed in to the 
world’s most famous microfinance institution; the Grameen Bank, and institutions that 
replicate its pioneering methodology world wide. The Grameen Bank today boasts a 
Nobel Prize, 1,700 branches, 16000 employees, and six million customers of which 96 % 
of them are women (Roodman and Qureshi 2006)  
 
Over 120 million people currently benefit from the services of over 10,000 microfinance 
institutions paying interest rates of between 15 and 35 % (Planet finance). In November 
2006 the official Microfinance Information exchange, Inc. (MIX Global 100) released 
some thought provoking statistics from the leading microfinance institutions. The most 
profitable microfinance institution in 2006 was from Africa with an average of 30.90 
percent return on assets, followed by another in Asia with an average of 30.2 percent 
return on assets.  On average the top 100 most profitable microfinance institutions world 
wide have an average of 10.44 % return on assets. The second largest microfinance 
institution, after Grameen in terms of client outreach is ASA with over 4 million clients; 
according to MIX Global 100, ASA has a 14.53 percent return on assets and it is among 
the top 15 global microfinance institutions in terms of profitability. The top 5 
Microfinance institutions in terms of outreach are all in Asia where high population 
density is the norm coupled with high level of poverty and lack of alternative finance. 
These unfortunate social characteristics are the ones that make Asia a prime market for 
microfinance (MIX Global 100, 2006).  Roodman and Qureshi (2006) argue that the real 
genius in microfinance is not because they firmly believe that the poor can pay, but rather 
it is because they have been able to come up with clever solutions to the problems of 
building volume, keeping loan repayment rates high, retaining customers, and 
minimizing scope for fraud and to be able to deliver cost effective microfinance 
deliveries to thousands and millions of poor clients.  
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2.6 Overview of the Economics of Lending to the Very Poor by Joint Liability  
Sharma (2000) writes that the spectacular growth of microfinance industry has been 
fuelled not by market forces but by conscious actions of national governments, non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs), and donors who view microfinance as an effective 
tool for alleviating poverty. Even with Sharma (2000) explanation, there still remains a 
very intriguing question: How has it been possible that microfinance institutions have 
achieved such tremendous growth within the last three decades? How is it that 
microfinance institutions have succeeded in serving the poor with financial services while 
the formal financial institutions have constantly failed?  Kiiru and Mburu (2007) argued 
that poverty and desperation of households make them a prime market for microfinance 
services. The writers argued that the poor are a prime market for credit services because 
of their liquidity needs for either consumption smoothing or for micro entrepreneurship 
purposes. Little wonder that Asia where high population density coupled with high level 
of poverty and lack of alternative finance is a prime market for microfinance (MIX 
Global 100, 2006).  
To reach economically disadvantaged clients with financial services requires innovative 
strategies. Joint liability lending institutions use “unconventional” methods to lend 
successfully to the poor. There is evidence that in many circumstances an unconventional 
lender such as the Grameen Bank can lend to poor people that no ordinary commercial 
bank would want for a customer. The unconventional lender can do so with a reasonable 
degree of financial self sufficiency and achieve repayment rates that are significantly 
higher than for comparable loans by conventional lending institutions (Schreiner 2003, 
Ghatak et al 1999). This thesis identifies four distinct but complementary reasons for this 
success. First, many (but not all) of these lending programmes ask borrowers to form a 
group in which all borrowers are jointly liable for each others loans. Second, individual 
group members engage in intensive monitoring to each other. Third, microfinance 
institutions rely heavily on the promise of repeat loans (dynamic incentives) for 
borrowers who perform well. Finally microfinance institutions impose forced savings by 
individual group members to lower the risks of moral hazards.  
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In analyzing joint liability lending institutions, economists have focused on either the 
effects of joint liability on the pool and behavior of borrowers, or on the fact that lending 
to groups as opposed to individuals is a way to reduce transactions costs for the 
microfinance institutions. If the socioeconomic characteristics of the borrowers are 
comparable to a large extent, it would be possible to put them together in a group to save 
on processing, screening and loan collection costs. This way the group enables the 
microfinance institution to avoid the cost of performing a costly audit every time an 
individual borrower declares inability to pay due to low output. This is because the 
microfinance institution will induce the rest of the group to undertake liability for the 
defaulting member. The microfinance institution will only audit when the whole group 
declares inability to repay. That group lending enables a reduction in transactions costs 
per loan for the microfinance institution. The most hailed advantage of group lending is 
that it makes it possible for the poor in the informal sector who have no collateral to 
access credit as long as they can be able to join a group. Some writers have even 
described it as “the apparent miracle of giving solvency to a community composed 
almost entirely of insolvent individuals’’5. 
Poverty reduction researchers have a distinct question of whether joint-liability lending 
really helps the poor. As a logical matter, a microfinance institution could function very 
well in terms of repayment rates but have little impact on poverty. This question, which is 
also the focus of this thesis, has also been asked before. Pitt and Khandker 1998 find, 
using data from three programs in rural Bangladesh, that borrowing from group-lending 
schemes increased consumption of poor house-holds. However, Morduch 1998b has 
argued that Pitt and Khandker’s result reflect program selection effects rather than the 
impact of borrowing per se.  
Given the objectives of the thesis it is better to focus on the effects of joint liability on the 
pool and behavior of borrowers rather than analyze joint liability as a costs mitigation 
measure by the microfinance institution. For readers who are interested on the latter 
issues Ghatak et al 1999, have a detailed theoretical framework that would be useful to 
consider.  
                                                 
5
 Plunkett 1904 , quoted in Ghatak et al 1999 . Horace Plunkett was a pioneer in the credit cooperative movement in Ireland at the 
turn of the 20th century. 
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2.6.1 Joint Liability Group functions   
Critics have argued that by use of group lending, micro-finance institutions have 
innovatively shifted two classic banking obligations to the borrowers; it is the poor who 
decide the credit worthiness of borrowers through peer selection in to the groups 
(Roodman and Qureshi 2006). Second, the poor bear most of the contract enforcement 
costs for all the individual group members while being governed by innovative contracts 
that are too costly to breach (Kiiru and Mburu 2007).  Shifting of these costs to borrowers 
has been innovatively achieved by use of joint liability lending, peer monitoring and peer 
pressure, dynamic incentives and forced savings.  
Within the context of joint liability lending literature, dynamic incentive reffers to the 
promise of bigger loans once the current loan has been repaid. Dynamic incentives 
motivate the clients to finish repaying their current loan with the hope of qualifying for a 
larger one. Schriener (2003) argues that dynamic incentives is supposed to make 
microfinance for the poor to work in a similar fashion as the credit card in developed 
countries; where clients repay because they want to access more credit in the future. On 
the other hand critics argue that dynamic incentives is a great incentive for poor clients to 
get caught up in a debt spiral as they seek new loans to clear older loans in an attempt to 
qualify for larger loans. Poor and unsuccessful entrepreneurs are likely to keep borrowing 
in order to repay, until the ultimate face to face with excess debt. Excess debt can lead to 
depletion of household capital assets as well as other basic livelihood assets, thereby 
leaving the household exposed and vulnerable.  
Joint responsibility lending as already discussed is also very important in serving the poor 
especially those with no collateral with financial services. another important aspect of 
joint laibaility lending is the principle of peer monitoring and peer pressure. The 
individuals within a group monitor and pressurise each other to ensure that all loans are 
repaid on time. Incase the individual is not able to repay due to wrong investments 
decisions or some other reason, then all the members of the group have a moral 
obligation to help in the repayment. Forced savings comes in very handy especially in 
reducing risks for the microfiance instituion. Individual borrowers are forced by the 
microfinance instituion to save a fixed amount of money every month. Neither the group 
nor the individual can access the forced savings at will, but it can be used as security for 
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future laons and can only be paid back if  the individual borrower is dropping out and has 
been cleared by all members of the group. The more the forced savings accumulate the 
easier it becomes for the borrower to access more loans in future as long as the group 
continues to support the borrower. It is also worthy noting that the forced saving is not 
only a guarantee for loans borrowed by an individual but can also be ceased by the 
microfiance instituion if any other member (s) of the group defaults on their loan 
repayment.  
 
2.6.2 Joint Liability Lending in Practice: The Genius of Microfinance 
The capacity of the poor to borrow and save may not be so obvious, yet one thing that 
can be least disputed is that their need to borrow and save may be greater than for better 
off people. This is because their incomes are tight and even volatile. Given the volatility 
of incomes, it would be very useful to have financial institutions that can help the poor 
manage their finances in a way that they can save when for example they receive 
remittances, or have sold some farm product or whenever they receive any extra money. 
On the other hand they would also borrow when there has been a shock in the household 
or just for consumption smoothing. Such a financial institution would be a matter of 
survival for poor households. Although they seem opposites, saving and borrowing could 
help the poor cope with the volatility in their incomes and maintain more stable 
consumption habits (Roodman and Qureshi 2006).  This implies that there is already the 
opportunity to serve the poor with financial services, since in principle they need the 
service; yet availing these services to the poor has been quite a challenge for formal 
financial institutions. Roodman and Qureshi (2006) observe that the genius of 
microfinance is the ability to find a suite of techniques that solve the complex business 
problems of building loan volumes, maintaining high repayment, retaining customers and 
minimizing the scope for fraud while dealing with very poor borrowers.  
 
This section concentrates purely on microfinance credit services that purely target the 
poorest in community through joint liability lending.  We pose a fundamental question of 
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how these institutions excel in lending to poor borrowers where other financial 
institutions have failed.  
Serving the poor with financial services requires providing small loan amounts to very 
many poor clients in the context of information asymmetries about borrowers’ credit 
worthiness. Logically, the costs of such services would be high and little wonder that 
formal financial institutions have for a long time sidelined the poor. We could 
conceptualize the idea of serving the poor with loans as an array or a spectrum. At one 
end of the spectrum we have very many poor clients, needing small loans, in a context 
full of information asymmetries. Then in between there is the “transformation matrix” by 
the microfinance institution that would lead to the other end of the spectrum where loan 
volumes build up, the clients become fewer, and the transaction costs are lowered and it 
is therefore possible to offer financial services to the poor. The following figure 
illustrates the point: 
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Figure 4: the genius of microfinance in availing credit the poor  
 
Providing such small loans to very many poor borrowers without collateral is only made 
practical by squeezing the operating costs as well as shifting certain tasks (costs) onto 
clients. This helps the microfinance institution to lower information costs and translate 
the loans sizes into larger ones that are cheaper for the MFI to administer, and more 
convenient for the individual client who basically has no collateral to offer the 
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Microfinance institution. The costs of monitoring of loan use and repayment, 
enforcement, as well as under writing costs (loan approval) are usually shifted to 
borrowers in group lending. Borrowers in such groups will accept these costs as long as 
they need the loans and have no other alternative. Whereas the poorest will have fewer 
alternatives and must therefore accept these conditions as long as they need the money, 
the better off poor may prefer individual lending as well as larger loans. Group borrowing 
is perceived to be too burdensome by the better off poor; whereas individual borrowing is 
perceived to be too expensive by the poor.  
 
2.6.3 Cross regional Comparison of Loan Acquisitions, Use and Repayment 
The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh which is also the largest microfinance institution in 
terms of outreach is mainly known for pioneering the formal joint liability lending to 
poor clients. Apparently research has shown that at least the Grameen Bank if not 
necessarily other micro lenders is a worthwhile social investment. This is so given that 
surplus for Grameen products users exceeded subsidy by non users (Schreiner, 2003). 
Behind the encouraging story of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and its success, it is 
important to consider the context both in terms of culture and socio economic setting. 
This is important especially for those countries and societies wishing to replicate the 
Grameen model to help alleviate poverty by availing financial services to the poor. This 
is because socio-cultural and economic conditions of different settings affect results to 
the extent that whatever model worked well in one setting may not necessarily work the 
same in another setting.  
 
Mohammed Yunus began his small lending program to poor households at a time when 
poverty in Bangladesh was quite rampant especially after the war and perennial floods 
that worsened the situation. Moved by the desperation of his people, Yunus who was then 
an economics professor at a university began lending some small amounts of money to 
poor women who would invest them in small micro enterprises. He discovered that the 
women were not only able to repay but they also paid on time. In the initial period, 
Grameen lend to both men and women in almost equal proportions. However in 1985 
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Yunus and his team refined the methodology to shift their lending pattern towards 
lending to more women than men.  
The women operated in small groups and they recruited their members based on trust and 
sometimes close family ties. The groups were jointly responsible for loan repayments as 
far as the microfinance institution was concerned. Normally they applied peer pressure 
and peer monitoring to ensure that every individual was responsible and accountable to 
the group for their own loan repayment. For cultural reasons, women were more sensitive 
to protecting the reputations of their families and were very sensitive to moral issues 
concerning shame, honour and reputation. The sensitivity to shame, honour and 
reputation turned to be a great asset for group members. For example Roodman and 
Qureshi (2006), found that “if a woman failed to make her instalment on time, she 
experienced humiliation through verbal aggression from fellow members and bank 
workers in the loan centre. Such humiliation was believed to bring a bad reputation 
(durman) to the males in the households and women were very careful about this. But if a 
man is humiliated no one talked about it because it does not bring a bad reputation 
(durman) to the household” (Roodman and Qureshi 2006). Loan officers testified that “it 
is very hard to work with male members in the field. They do not come for meetings and 
they are arrogant they even argue with the bank workers and even threaten to scare the 
bank workers” (Roodman and Qureshi 2006). In this respect, the cultural setting and the 
social norms and values influenced loan repayment in Bangladesh. Based on the same 
socio cultural setting it was much more practical from a business perspective to work 
with women than men. 
 
Sensitivity to shame honour and reputation by women in communities has worked well to 
encourage loan repayment especially in Asia. Roodman and Qureshi (2006) observed that 
even MFIs that do not employ either joint liability or regular group meetings for 
transaction purposes still tapped into this sensitivity to reputation for delinquency control. 
For example XacBank in Mongolia posts names of clients and their installment 
repayment reports on the walls of its branches. In this context then peer pressure could 
also be defined as pressure arising from public transactions in communities where 
individuals worry about reputations. This discovery is not really new to micro credit. 
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Money lenders too have used public honor to motivate repayments. For example when 
interviewed, a woman street vendor who was a client of a group of moneylenders called 
"the Bombays" in the Philippines said that “the Bombays always picked the busiest hour 
of the day to collect so that there would always be witnesses to her embarrassment" 
(Roodman and Qureshi 2006). 
 
The forgoing not withstanding, research has shown that income accruing to women in the 
household has a great impact on household expenditures unlike income accruing to 
males. There is therefore likely to be a positive externality to the household in the process 
of focussing more on women for credit delivery, as long as the credit is able to improve 
household incomes. Another important gain is defined by the fact that women have an 
opportunity to gather week after week to conduct business in group meetings. This alone 
is a mile stone in changing norms about women’s use of public space. Another important 
gain is that NGOs and microfinance institutions have had an opportunity to channel other 
non financial services to women during the group meetings. These financial services 
included adult literacy where members learnt how to sign documents and operate simple 
arithmetic and book keeping. Other services channelled through women groups included 
family planning services, nutrition education among other services. For example, in the 
initial Grameen joint lending programs, each group meeting began my members chanting 
slogans to the effect that hey would have smaller families, and educate their girl children 
among other empowering slogans (Schriener 2003). 
 
Unlike in Asia, tapping in to shame, honour and reputation for delinquency control does 
not always work in other communities. For the period we were in the field collecting data 
for this study we witnessed several cases and heard many more cases of women who took 
the loan money and ran away to big cities and other towns, leaving behind their peers to 
repay on their behalf. This kind of precedence if not addressed is likely to lead to domino 
effects, where borrowers who would have repaid may choose to default because they 
would either loose access to future loans anyway due to the default of others or they 
would have others repay on their behalf.  The apparent lack of trust lead to caused joitn 
liability groups to ask for “collaterals and guarantors from prospective members.  
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According to Diagne 2000, Joint liability groups with the Malawi Rural Finance 
Corporation (MRFC) were not allowed to repossess each others assets due to non 
repayment of loans. They were also not required to impose any more costs on their 
members and definitely they did not have to join any other informal credit group as a 
precondition to participate in the microfinance program. MRFC is a state-owned financial 
institution that seeks to offer agricultural credit to small farmers in the rural areas through 
joint liability lending.  Results from studies focussing on the MRFC Corporation have 
contrasted to conventional wisdom and assumptions regarding the informal advantage of 
the joint liability lending and its implications for incentives for peer selection, peer 
monitoring and peer pressure with respect to loan repayment. Research findings did not 
support the widely held presumption that joint liability is responsible for high repayment 
rates. In particular the study found that no affective peer monitoring was taking place in 
the credit groups because of the social costs associated with it (Diagne, 2000). The study 
also found that peer pressure took place less frequently. Even when peers pressurized 
defaulters, in most cases they failed to induce defaulters to repay their loans (Diagne, 
2000).  Once again these particular results could be understood in the light of what has 
already been discussed about the pitfalls of state backed loans.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Profile of the project area 
Makueni district is located in the Eastern province of Kenya. It lies in the Arid and 
Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) zone and it is divided into 16 divisions and has a 
population of about 778,000 people. The district has semi-arid vegetation, with low and 
erratic rainfall. Hence the people rely on an inadequate, fragile and uncertain resource 
base under constant threat of drought, resulting in food insecurity and under nutrition. 
Using both the Welfare Monitoring Survey System (WMS 1998), and the Participatory 
Poverty Ranking Method (PPRM), over 70 percent of households were classified as poor 
or very poor.  These characteristics make the district good for any experimental poverty 
reduction intervention. 
The main livelihood of the people is subsistence agriculture, of which 90 percent is rain-
fed and about 10 percent with irrigation. Livestock rearing and apiculture (bee-keeping) 
are also common. Other income generating activities include hired labour, mainly in 
small towns, and the irrigation schemes, selling of charcoal and fire-wood, brick making, 
petty trading, selling of vegetables (by those who have irrigation) and, when available, 
food aid. Women do most of the agricultural activities. Men are largely involved in other 
income generating activities in and out of the vicinity. There is a serious concern about 
the environment. The forest is being depleted, owing to the massive burning of charcoal, 
which leads to desertification and worsens the drought situation, and thereby aggravates 
food insecurity. Several efforts are under way to counter deforestation but so far they 
have achieved limited success owing to the demands of household food security. For a 
map of Kenya showing the exact location of the district refer to the appendix section.  
The exact villages studied are at the South Western part of the province and they border 
Kajiado district which is in the Rift valley Province. The area had been hit by a severe 
drought since previous 5 years prior to the study. Only few better off families had dug 
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wells and were involved in irrigated garden farming. Majority of the other households 
had taken in to non agricultural income generating activities like micro enterprising to 
earn a living. Little wonder that 88% of all the respondents said that business was their 
primary occupation even though they were in a rural setting. Many of the economic 
activities included micro enterprising, hired or casual labour, bicycle taxiing commonly 
known as “boda boda”. No cash crops had been grown in the area for the last 5 years due 
to the drought.  
Microfinance is thriving in the area, this could be influenced by the fact that the main 
highway (Mombasa-Nairobi) passes through the study area cris-crossing small shopping 
centers like Makindu, Emali and Simba. The shopping centers had influenced the 
economic activities of the surrounding rural villages as more and more households took 
up micro entrepreneurships to earn a living. The research area is served by three major 
microfinance institution KWFT (Kenya women Finance trust) that served 60% of all 
microfinance participants studied, KRep served 20% and Kadet (Kenya Agency to 
Development of Enterprise and Technology) served 20%. KWFT gave loans to women 
entrepreneurs only. Except KRep Bank that could offer saving services as well as both 
individual and group loans, the other microfinance institutions could only provide credit 
services and they mainly relied on joint liability lending.  
3.2 The Methodology 
The study is designed as an experimental case study using panel data. A randomized 
sample of respondents from 16 villages in Makueni district was used. There were two 
sets of respondents; one set consisted of 200 respondents who were microfinance 
recipients. The criterion for choosing the microfinance participants was that the 
respondent should not be older than two months in the program at the beginning of the 
survey. The idea was to capture household socioeconomic welfare before and after the 
micro credit loans. A list of all new lending groups (up to two months old) was obtained 
from the local offices of the microfinance intuitions operating in the area. From this list 
respondents were selected randomly. It turned out that the respondents were from 16 
different villages, all within proximity of up to 10 kilometers radius from the 
microfinance institution’s local field offices, which were mainly located within the main 
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shopping centers. The other set of respondents was for control purposes. It consisted of a 
random sample of 200 respondents who did not receive micro credit loans at the 
beginning of the survey.  
 Formal Structured questionnaires were administered every six months to both 
participants of microfinance and non participants. For the microfinance participants, the 
idea was to capture, group participation, new loans, uses, and loan repayment as well as 
household incomes. While for non participants the idea was to keep up with households’ 
socioeconomic activities and understand any welfare changes in the absence of 
microfinance.   
Rapid appraisals in the form of focus group discussions with joint liability borrowing 
groups and semi structured interviews with key informants were used. The rapid 
appraisal provided a platform where issues related to microfinance like group lending and 
group activities were discussed openly and respondents were able to check each other to 
avoid situations of exaggerations or misreporting.  Participant observation was also quite 
helpful in accessing in-depth detailed information about the operations of solidarity 
groups. Participant observation in this sense refers to the informal interaction of the 
researcher and the local community in the study area by way of temporary stay within the 
community. This way, it was possible to observe the respondents go about their day today 
activities without them fearing that they are being studied. This makes it possible to learn 
first hand the realities of household, community and individual behavior towards 
microfinance. Most importantly through participant observation it was possible to 
observe practical issues of how some individual household attributes and Lending Groups 
influence loan uses, repayment and general household activities that affect household 
incomes. 
 
3.2.1 Why focus on assets in measuring household welfare 
Economies of developing countries are characterized by an acute lack of integration of 
both the rural and urban economies. Poor rural households have to do with poor 
infrastructure if any; they are mainly subsistence farmers usually consuming most of 
what they produce and commercial activity in the rural areas is very low. Formal saving 
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and banking institutions are rare and as such households invest for the purposes of 
“saving” in highly liquid assets like livestock, or other highly liquid capital assets like 
ploughs. If the household’s welfare improves significantly they acquire other assets that 
are not very liquid like solar panels among other electronic assets. For very well off 
households they may add other expensive investments like water boreholes or own small 
scale wind powered electricity generators. It is for these reasons that ownership of and 
access to assets is a very important socioeconomic indicator in the rural areas.  
 
In this particular study ownership of assets6  was particularly important even for the issue 
of microfinance. The socio cultural setting is such that people do not just trust each other 
by word of mouth alone. Because of the lack of trust, if a household wanted to participate 
in a microfinance program, ownership of assets is of utmost importance. To join a group 
in order to access microfinance services, group members demanded to be shown what 
assets could be liquidated by the group incase of default to pay individual loans. The 
informal guaranteeing of individual loans is a way of reducing financial risks to the group 
members since they are all jointly responsible for each others loans. To be able to 
compile a legitimate7 list of assets which could be used for measuring poverty in the 
context of this study, borrowers in lending groups were asked to write down all the assets 
that are available among members and that could be used to secure their loans. The result 
of this exercise was that the poor don’t have many assets and virtually every asset they 
had apart from land was eligible to act as “collateral” depending on its condition, “good 
or bad”.  These assets included kitchenware, simple electronics, clothing, furniture, and 
livestock among other basic household assets.  
 
The other advantage of this approach in the study is that in case a household has had 
problems of repayment of their loans the same assets would be liquidated (in most cases). 
On the other hand, if a household was successful, it was likely to accumulate more assets, 
both highly liquid and “non liquid”. Barnes et al (1993), observes that there is a strong 
case that assets are particularly useful indicator of impact because their level does not 
                                                 
6
 The wealth index compiled in this study is only relevant to the study area and therefore the same relative 
poverty measure can not be used for another study.    
7
 The list of assets that is relevant in the study context 
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fluctuate as greatly as other economic indicators and it is not simply based on annual 
estimates.  
Apart from ownership of assets focus group discussions revealed that the general 
condition of a homestead is also a strong indication of the social economic status of that 
particular household. In light of this, other variables like walls, roofing and floor of main 
house among other well being indicators were used to explain household socioeconomic 
status. For both theoretical and practical reasons, poverty indictors based on consumption  
were preferred than those based on income.  This is more the case because households are 
likely to provide information easily on what they consume than on what they earn (Zeller 
et al 2006).  
Table 1 is a list of the indicators used in this study to construct a relative poverty 
measure. The important thing that the reader should bear in mind while reading this 
section is that  this list is based on what is already available in the study context and if the 
context changes then it is possible to change the indicators as well as the specific list of 
assets.  
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Table 1: Poverty Indicators Used in the study 
Poverty Indicator at household level Definition 
Human Capital   
Literate household members % of household members with some 
basic formal education (primary 
education) 
Adults who are wage laborers within the 
household 
Members of households who bring in 
extra income to the households excluding 
children 
Education level  of household head Number of years spent in “progressive” 
formal education  
  
Dwelling 
 
Size of dwelling Number of rooms 
Walls  
Type: whether temporary or permanent 
and cost 
 
Flooring materials Type: whether temporary or permanent 
and cost 
Type of cooking materials  Type: firewood with open fire, firewood 
with modified saving cooker, Charcoal, 
Kerosene and gas. 
Latrines Availability of a bathroom facility within 
the household 
Water source Open river, borehole, water vendoring 
  
Assets  
Livestock (goats, chicken, sheep, cows, 
oxen, donkey) 
Number  
capital assets (ownership of donkey cart,  
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sawing machines, plough, rental houses 
and oxcart) 
household cutlery like china ware and 
aluminum cooking pots and furniture 
such as sofa chairs, tables, stools, beds, 
clothing such as “good”  bed linen, and  
“good” clothing fabrics). 
 
Number  
electronics (mobile phones, radios and 
televisions) 
Number 
Irrigated land owned by household Size in acres 
  
electronics (mobile phones, radios and 
televisions); domestic animals and hen);  
Size in acres 
Irrigated land owned by household  Size in acres 
  
Food security and vulnerability  
Ability to grow enough basic food 
supplies 
Number in months household produced 
staple food lasts 
Meals in a day Number 
Expenditures of basic processed food 
products like sugar tea leaves and 
cooking fat 
Monthly expenditures averaged by 
number of household members 
Food expenditures on “luxury” food like 
meat and chicken in this context 
Monthly expenditures averaged by 
number of household members 
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3.2.2 The Empirical Link between Assets and Household Spending 
Asset-based welfare has provoked much attention in recent times. The argument for asset 
based welfare is based on the notion that the stocks of wealth that an individual holds and 
not just their income or consumption should be seen as important when assessing their 
wellbeing (Paxton 2003). Asset-based welfare emphasizes the importance of individuals 
acquiring and accumulating assets of various sorts as a way of promoting economic and 
social economic development. Studies have shown that wealth is positively associated 
with physical health and socio emotional behavior (William 2003). In their contribution 
to the subject, Zhan and Sherraden (2003) found that single mothers’ assets have been 
proven to be positively associated with children’s education attainment. Acquisition and 
possession of assets is therefore very important for social protection and economic 
development.  
Depending on the conceptual framework, the relationship between possessions and the 
condition of poverty can be either a poverty profile or an attempt to understand the 
determinants of poverty (Escobal, et al, 2000). Based on the static model of optimization 
of household decisions on production and consumption, it is possible to derive a 
relationship between household poverty and possession of assets, which is susceptible to 
empirical evaluation.  
 
Assuming that households as producers maximize benefits subject to technological 
restrictions of the production function and as consumers maximize their welfare by 
optimizing their consumption and work decisions subject to the gains, we could establish 
a direct connection between possession of and access to assets and levels of spending by 
the household or individual (Escobal, et al., 2000). The reduced form of this optimization 
problem can be represented in the form of a spending equation: 
 
( ) ( )orgpubfinfishum AAAAMYAMYY &,,,;; ==                                                            (1) 
Where Y is total household income, M is the price vector and A is the vector that 
includes all the assets that the household has access to. The assets are classified under 
four (multidimensional) categories: those associated with human capital (Ahum), physcical 
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capital (Afis), financial Capital (Afin), and public and organizational capital (Apub &org). 
Given a relative definition of poverty, equation one can be written as  
 
( )iiii XfZPZE α== )()(                                                                                          (2) 
 
( )
orgpubfinfishumii AAAAfZP &,,,)( =
                                                                         (2´)                       
Where ( )iZE  is the expected relative poverty index for individual household which is a 
function of access to assets. iP  denotes individual household probability, iX  is a vector 
of household assets. In this regard, the original possession of assets, their process of 
accumulation and the existence of external shocks would be the determinants of the 
transition of individuals or households along the scale of income or spending. It is 
therefore possible to derive an equation that represents the transition of a household from 
one level of spending to another, or put otherwise from one level of poverty to another.   
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                                                         (3)  
 
Where all variables have been defined, except ή which represents a vector of short term 
shock which might have an effect on current income. 
3.2.3 Why use Relative Poverty 
Poverty encompasses not only income for the satisfaction of basic needs but also human, 
physical, environmental, social, and political capital as a means of achieving income 
(Zeller et al 2005). On the same note, poverty may expresses itself in a multidimensional 
outcome; being conditioned by the socioeconomic, cultural, institutional and political 
environment. The outcome indicators of poverty relate to the various dimensions of 
poverty that include food security, health, nutrition, education, housing, clothing, human 
and civic rights, the quality of social networks as well as psycho-social indicators such as 
self esteem ( Zeller et al 2006).  
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To capture the multiple dimensions of poverty (as causal or outcome) requires both 
qualitative and quantitative indicator variables. Development practice has three major 
types of poverty assessments. The first is the construction of the absolute poverty line. 
This involves taking in to account the way household expenditures fall short of the 
poverty line. The data requirements for this method are quite steep, costly to meet, as 
well as it is time consuming. 
 The other approach to poverty measurement is the rapid appraisal method. In this 
method, households are ranked with respect to their wealth by community members. A 
simple rapid appraisal method may involve only focus group discussions or key 
informant interviews.  Rapid appraisal method is usually grouped together with the 
participatory wealth ranking method. Participatory wealth ranking involves the 
participation of the general community, to define what it means to be poor and to give a 
definition to indicators that are used to measure poverty. A relative poverty index is then 
computed and households socioeconomic status is ranked based on this index. Both rapid 
appraisal and participatory wealth ranking are highly subjective, but they are very helpful 
if the policy maker is to understand what the community really understands as 
development and poverty reduction. This piece of information is specifically important in 
terms of implementing development projects that are likely to gain support and adoption 
by the local community.  
 
Both rapid appraisal methods and participatory wealth ranking have been widely used 
and accepted as methods for identifying vulnerable groups in a given community (Zeller 
et al 2005). Kiiru and Mburu (2007) used rapid appraisal method to measure relative 
poverty in their attempt to measure vulnerability. The major weakness of these methods 
is their subjectivity and their regional orientation that makes comparison across regions 
impossible. But for all practical purposes, to be poor is relative; and therefore for the 
purposes of policy and evaluations, then it is the relativity in poverty that really matters 
most to the policy maker. 
This thesis prefers to use a relative poverty measure for several reasons:  First, there is 
both a time and a resource constrain to perform a detailed, costly and cumbersome 
procedure as the absolute poverty index. Second, even if secondary data was used, it may 
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not be the best data for the objectives of this study where the intention is to capture 
marginal income changes within a short period of time. Third, a relative poverty measure 
is perceived to be the better option in this context because it makes it possible to capture 
marginal welfare changes for both microfinance participants and non participants within 
the relatively short period.   
3.2.4  Measuring Vulnerability 
Vulnerability could be defined as the probability or risk today of being in poverty or to 
fall into deeper poverty in the future. It is a key dimension of welfare since a risk of large 
changes in income may constrain households to lower investments in productive assets. 
High risk can also force households to diversify their income sources, perhaps at the cost 
of lower returns. For example, due to the high risks involved in microfinance, poor 
borrowers may invest in over-exploited business ventures with fast though marginal 
returns. This way they are able to manage their monthly or sometimes weekly payments 
and contributions (Kiiru and Mburu 2007).  
Vulnerability could pose a challenge in measurement in that  anticipated income or 
consumption changes are important to individuals and households before they occur—
and even regardless of whether they occur at all—as well as after they have occurred 
(Hoddinot and Qusumbing 2003). For the empirical analysis of vulnerability it is 
conventional that the analysis of household poverty dynamics and variability of other 
welfare outcomes be used as proxies for vulnerability.  
In the measurement of vulnerability in this study, vulnerability is defined as expected 
poverty, or the probability that a household falls in to poverty in the future. The 
vulnerability of household h at time t denoted as htV  is the probability that the household 
poverty index will be below the poverty mean index for the overall population which for 
this case is defined as the relative poverty line z; ( Chadhuri et al 2002). 
 
Following Chadhuri et al (2002) vulnerability of household h for n periods denoted as 
R(.) for “risk” is the probability of observing at least one spell of drop below a relative 
poverty line for the n periods which is one minus the probability of no episodes of 
dropping below a relative poverty line: 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )[ ]zntyPztyPznR hhh <+−<+−−= ,1,.....1,11,                                      (4) 
A household is therefore said to be vulnerable if the condition holds true, zero otherwise 
 
Y in this case could be the outcome, for which its variability determines household 
vulnerability..  
3.2.5 Econometric Issues in Measuring Impact  
Determining whether the benefits of microfinance programs are sustainable and large 
enough to make a dent in the poverty of participants and society at large is important for 
guiding policy. However efforts to assess the impact of microfinance programs can be 
biased by non random program placement and participation. This is so mainly because 
microfinance programs tend to be placed in areas where the incidence of poverty are high 
and therefore lack formal banking institutions. Therefore a simple comparison of the 
incidence of poverty in program and non program areas may lead to the mistaken 
conclusion that microfinance programs have increased poverty. In the same note, those 
who participate may self-select into a program based on unobserved traits such as 
entrepreneurial ability. In that case, simply comparing such outcomes as per capita 
consumption or the incidence of poverty between program participants and non 
participants may lead to the mistaken conclusion that the programs have a high impact on 
poverty reduction, when indeed the effects are due to the unobserved abilities of 
participants. Thus the estimated effects may be under, or overestimated depending on the 
type of analysis.  
Coleman (1999) uses the following empirical specification to illustrate the bias 
potentially arising from self-selection and endogenous program placement: 
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)5.......(......................................................................,.........
ijYijYjYijij
ijBjijij
BVXY
VXB
µδβα
εβα β
+++≡
++≡
 
 
 61 
Where ijB  is the amount borrowed from the microfinance institution by household i in 
village j; ijX  is a vector of household characteristics; jV  is a vector of village 
characteristics; ijY  is an outcome for ith household living in village j on which we want to 
measure impact; YYBB βαβα ,,,  and Yδ  are parameters to be estimated: and ijε  and ijµ  
are errors representing unmeasured household and village characteristics that determine 
borrowing and outcomes, respectively. Yδ  is the primary parameter of interest as it 
measures the impact of microfinance on outcome ijY . Coleman (2006) observes that 
econometric estimation of this equation system will yield biased parameter estimates if 
ijε  and ijµ  are correlated and this correlation is not taken in to account. The source of the 
correlation of the error terms could arise from both self selection and the endogenous 
placement of the microfinance institutions.  
 
Another source of bias in impact estimation could be an oversight in engendered 
borrowing. Pitt and Khandker (1998) find that impact of microfinance on poverty varies 
by gender, and therefore it is misleading to look only at the impact of borrowing by the 
household. In order to control for selection bias, Coleman (1999) uses the following 
specification,  
 
ijijijjijij VBMOSMVXY ηδγβα ++++=                                                                        (7) 
 
Where ijY  is an outcome of household i in village j on which we want to measure 
program impact, ijX  is a vector of household characteristics, jV  is a vector of village 
fixed effects; ijM  is a membership dummy variable equal 1 if household ij is selected in 
to the microfinance program, and 0 otherwise; and ijVBMOS  is the number of months the 
microfinance institution has been available to members. Coleman (1999) uses the 
membership dummy ijM  to proxy the unobservable characteristics that are relevant for 
households to self select in to the microfinance programs, and that might affect outcomes. 
The variable ijVBMOS  measures the extent of program availability to members who have 
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self selected. Unlike the amount borrowed it is exogenous to the household. For the 
control households it equals zero while for participating members it is positive in varying 
amounts. The inclusion of non microfinance participants in the sample combined with the 
use of fixed effects, controls for the possible endogenous program placement. In this 
specification, δ is an unbiased or consistent measure of impact per month of program 
availability. Controlling for biases as explained above made a lot of difference in the 
results. Coleman (1999) found that average program impact was not significantly 
different from zero after controlling for endogenous member selection and program 
placement.  
 
Later on Coleman (2006) extended the estimating frame work to differentiate impacts on 
households with different socioeconomic background. One group of the household was 
relatively better off, more powerful and tended to be selected in to microfinance program 
committee boards where they could influence larger loans for themselves (if they so 
wished). The other group was composed of ordinary households (who he calls “rank and 
file” members). Coleman (2006) further estimated the impact by number of months of 
program availability to each of the two groups of households as follows:   
 
ijCijRijCijRijjijij CMOSRMOSMCMRVXY µδδγγβα ++++++=                               (8) 
 
Subscripts i and j indicate individual households and village placements respectively. 
Subscripts R and C denote if a household is classified as a rank and file member or a 
committee member respectively. ijMR  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is 
a rank and file member, 0 otherwise; ijMC  is a dummy variable equal 1 if household has 
a village bank committee membership and Zero otherwise; ijRMOS  is the number of 
months of rank and file membership while ijCMOS  is the number of months of 
committee membership and the other variables are defined as before. In this specification 
Rδ  measures the impact of an additional month’s program availability to a rank and file 
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member, and Cδ  measures the impact of an additional month’s program availability to a 
committee member. An F test could be used determine whether CR δδ = .  
 
With this model Coleman found that most impacts were not statistically significant for 
the rank and file members but there were some noted significant impacts for the 
committee members particularly on wealth accumulation. The loan sizes accessed by the 
rank and file members were an issue in this particular survey. Coleman argues that the 
loan sizes were too small to make any significant differences in household welfare. The 
size of loans even prompted some women to leave the microfinance programs arguing 
that  the loans were too small for any meaningful income generating activity (Coleman 
2006). Coleman argues that one reason why wealthier borrowers may have experienced 
larger impacts was because they could commandeer larger loans.  
 
It may be also useful to try the differencing method as proposed by Aghion and Morduch 
(2005). Equation (9) could be modified to specify that the variables are measured in a 
given time period t:  
 
ijtijtijjijtijt TMVXY ηδγβα ++++=                                                                            (9) 
 
We are interested in estimating the value of δ ,which is the coefficient on the variable 
that measure impact. itY is the dependant variable and it is the household level outcome 
for household i in village j at time t. The variables ijtX  capture household characteristics 
at t (and a constant term), and jV  is a vector of village dummy variable that are assumed 
fixed over time. ijM  is a vector of individual specific variables that capture non random 
individual selection  in to the program and they are also fixed over time. The same set of 
indicators could be collected once again in time period 1+t , and  make the following 
model specification.  
 
1111 ++++ ++++= ijtijtijjijtijt TMVXY ηδγβα                                                                     (10) 
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Then we could subtract equation 9 from 10 to obtain: 
 
ijijijij CXY ηδα ∆+∆+∆=∆                                                                                            (11) 
 
Where ∆  indicates the difference in the variables between period t and t+1. In this 
equation the village dummies drop out as do the fixed (and unobservable) individual 
specific characteristics. Alexander (2001) used a similar difference in difference 
approach with data from Peru. Her findings were that the estimated impacts on enterprise 
profits fell after controlling for reverse causality. Controlling for reverse causality in the 
study Alexander (2001) used an instrumental variable approach and the result was that  
the estimated impacts shrank and were no longer statistically significant. Instrumental 
variable method allows researchers to address problems caused by measurement error, 
reverse causality and some omitted variables.   
Given the sensitivity to instruments used to measure impact of microfinance, there are 
compelling reasons to use alternative approaches to confirm the results. For this purpose 
it may help to introduce time dynamics in the forgoing estimations and estimate a pooled 
data regression model with fixed village and individual effects. The main reason for using 
pooled data over cross-sectional data in impact assessment is because cross-sectional 
results may not be robust. In this model it is assumed that current household income 
depends on both current and past characteristics, including access to loans.   
 
                              (12) 
 
Where 1+itY  is the current individual household income ( )itX  is the previous vector of 
individual household characteristics, 1+itX  is a vector of current household 
characteristics, itS  is the previous total loan size that the household acquired in the 
previous period, 1+itS  is the current loan size that the household has acquired from the 
microfinance institution, jV  is the village effects, itT  is the variable whose coefficient 
measures the impact of microfinance on household income in the previous period., 1+itT  is 
ηγφδβκσϕα ++++++++= ++++ iititjititititit MTTVSSXXY 1111
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the variable whose coefficient captures impact in the current period and η  is the error 
term. We use a participation M dummy to control of unobserved and unmeasured 
household characteristics that determine household income. γφδβκσϕα ,,,,,,,  are 
coefficients to be estimated.  
 
The initial impulse in impact estimation would be to use the coefficient of the loan size 
that the household acquired as the proxy of the impact of microfinance on household 
income. Coleman 1999 correctly points that the demand for loan is highly correlated with 
household income and therefore the coefficient for loan access may be a biased estimator 
of impact.  
In the context of this study the number of times borrowed would be a better candidate as 
an estimator for impact. Unlike the amount borrowed it is exogenous to the household 
since it depends on first how long the microfinance program has been available to the 
household and also peers in a joint liability group determine how many times they would 
allow one member to borrow. We are therefore interested in φ and δ  as the measure of 
the impact of microfinance on household income for both the current and the previous 
credit.   
 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
3.3.1 Conceptualizing Impact Chains and Measurement 
The overriding assumption of all microfinance programs is that the intervention will 
change household access to productive resources in a way that lead to achievement of 
higher household consumption of goods and services and overall economic well being. 
The biggest challenge in impact assessment is to separate and capture the assumed causal 
role. To capture the impact of an intervention program, one must control for selection and 
reverse causation. For example, even if there seems to be improvements in household 
access to goods and services after the intervention, there still remains questions about 
whether the improvements are significant as without the intervention. On the same note if 
it is observed that richer households access more loans, the important question is whether 
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the loans made the households richer or is it because they are rich that they can access 
more loans. The latter is the so called reverse causation. Selection bias has a lot to do 
with pre-existing attributes associated with participants in microfinance programmes. For 
example, a household may already have good entrepreneurship skills or managerial 
capabilities or better education that may already give them some advantage even without 
the microfinance programme. This means that without control for such selection biases 
and reverse causation then impacts could be over estimated or underestimated. McKernan 
(as quoted by Aghion and Morduch 2005) finds that failure to control for selection bias 
can lead to overestimation of the effect of microfinance on profits by as much as 100%. 
In other cases controlling for these biases reverses conclusions about impacts entirely 
(Aghion and Morduch 2005).   A simple model for impact chains can be illustrated as 
follows:-  
 
  
Figure 5: Model of the Impact chain: Adapted from Hulme 1999 
 
The impact chain provides a very simplified notion of capturing impact. In reality, 
income depends on many different attributes and not just microfinance alone. Some of 
the attributes like participants age, education status, among other attributes can be 
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 67 
observed and measured. However there are other attributes that are very difficulty to 
measure as well as observe. These may include entrepreneurship capability, 
organizational ability and persistence in entrepreneurship. Yet calculating the impact of 
microfinance requires that we disentangle the role of microfinance on incomes and the 
role played by the other attributes both measurable and un-measurable.  
 
Consider figure 6.  T1 refers to the treatment households before intervention and T2 
refers to the same household after intervention. C1 refers to the control households in the 
initial period of the study and C2 refers to the control households at the later period of the 
study. For measurement purposes we assume that impact is experienced only by those 
households that participate in microfinance programmes after some time. Lets call the 
time when impact is experienced T2. For the purposes of this study, T2 is taken to be 18 
months since the household joined the programme. The initial household income is 
reflected by position T1. The difference between T2 and T1 shows the combined effects of 
both measurable and un measurable effects on income by all attributes that do not change 
over time including location related attributes. However the same way that the difference 
captures impact due to microfinance it also captures impact due to broad economic 
changes that have occurred to all households both microfinance participants and non 
participants over the same period. For example good rainfall and therefore good harvests 
by all households may mean improved incomes for all households regardless of their 
participation status in microfinance programmes; similarly flooding or other natural 
disasters may mean that all households will suffer negative effects regardless of their 
participation in microfinance programmes. This implies that attributing the entirety of T2-
T1 difference to microfinance may be quite misleading.  
 
To control for selection biases we include a control group from households that do not 
receive microfinance. The base income levels for the “control group” (the non participant 
households) may be different from the base income levels of the “treatment group” (the 
participant households). What this means is that comparing the difference between T2 and 
C2 will help address biases due to the broadly felt economic and social changes, but it 
will not account for differing base levels. Isolating the true impact of microfinance 
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requires comparing the difference T2-T1, with the difference C2-C1, which has also been 
referred to as the difference-in-difference approach (Aghion and Morduch 2005).  
 
Figure 6:    Sources of Income for treatment and control group: Adapted from Aghion and 
Morduch 2005 
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3.3.2  Conceptualizing Microfinance Participation, Household Assets and 
Vulnerability  
Sustainable livelihood approaches have focused on assets to measure vulnerability 
(Dercon, 2001). Quantitative work has also found that access to assets is an important 
determinant of poverty and of the ability to cope with hardship. Depending on the 
conceptual framework, the relationship between ownership of assets and the condition of 
poverty can be either a poverty profile or an attempt to understand the determinants of 
poverty (Escobal, et al, 2000). All assets share a common characteristic, namely that 
alone or in conjunction with other assets they produce a stream of income over a period 
of time (Hoddinot and Quisumbing 2003). Some assets have a second characteristic 
namely they are a store of value. The availability and the subsequent allocation of assets 
in to income generating activities results to income, which is a determinant of 
consumption, poverty and vulnerability.  
 
Field work for this study established that there is a strong positive link between 
ownership of assets by households and probability of being selected or accepted in a joint 
liability lending. Before accepting any new member, group members have a vetting 
process. The vetting process ensures that they recruit members with the capability to 
repay loans or at least own some assets. There already exists some “formal agreements” 
within groups that allows group members to seize the property of a defaulting member 
and help recover any money they may loose due to the default.  For this reason joint 
liability members are always at risk of loosing livelihood assets in case of bad investment 
decisions or a negative shock that may affect business returns. This is especially the case 
if the household has no other source of income. Already studies exist that show that debt 
for vulnerable households could make them worse off due to their effects on livelihood 
assets incase of inability to repay or gender biases in the control of household recources, 
(Mayoux 2002, Kiiru and Mburu 2007, Kiriti 2006, Gulli 1999). 
The shifting of costs to the poor in the pursuit of sustainable lending institutions that cater 
for the poor could instead fuel insecurity amongst the borrowers. Insecurity is an 
important component of welfare and can be understood as vulnerability to a decline in 
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well-being. To formally conceptualize the issue of microfinance Participation, household 
Assets and vulnerability we need to focus on three components namely; settings, assets 
and activities. Settings for microfinance participation refer to all the intra group insurance 
activities and the working environment. Assets in this case encompass a broad definition 
as discussed under section 3.2.1. The allocation of assets in to activities to generate 
income and therefore a livelihood is conditioned by the settings in which the households 
find themselves.  
We first link microfinance participation with the activities involved, risks, and the risk 
coping strategies available to households. Consider a new entrant in to the microfinance 
joint lending program. The intra group insurance and joint liability lending is 
characterized by weekly meetings, monthly contribution both for loan repayment and 
other contributions. There are also other activities related to debt recovery from defaulted 
peers, as well as vetting of new members.  
All Members also have capital endowments and labour which in this case is broadly 
defined as household assets which is a key ex ante risk coping strategy. Figure 8 is an 
attempt to link microfinance participation in to the general household endowment and 
allocation across a number of activities, mainly agricultural and non agricultural activities 
which depend on the household perception of the level and variability of the various 
activities and the associated returns of every activity. The liquidity of household assets 
has a high positive relationship with the probability of being selected in to joint a 
microfinance lending program. For example, Dercon (1996) finds that in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania , the possession of more liquid assets such as livestock is a precondition for 
entry in to higher return , but higher risk activities.  
 
The relationship between microfinance participation, household endowments and 
household choice of activity to generate income is affected by the likelihood of shocks. 
The shocks may include non repayment by some peers, failed business venture, sickness 
or any other unexpected activity that can affect household income. These kind of shocks 
in return affect household capability of future loan repayment and further affect 
household consumption of goods and services.  Income generation and consumption in 
the presence of loan repayment obligation is likely to adapt to ex post risk management. 
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For example, households may incur other debts to offset the already mature debts 
(Roodman and Qureshi 2006) or households may alter investments in human capital.  
 
In conclusion therefore, household welfare and thus vulnerability depends on the nature 
of shock, the availability of additional sources of income and the extent of public 
assistance (Hoddinot and Quisumbing (2003). The ex post responses to shocks generate 
feedback mechanisms which may affect household consumption decisions 
 
 
Figure 8: The link  between microfinance, assets and vulnerability 
Adapted from Hoddinot and Quisumbing (2003) 
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3.3.3 Conceptualizing the joint liability group as an institution  
The joint liability lending group could be conceptualized as an independent institution 
that operates with the following assumptions:  
(i) Individuals join the groups and are already aware of the risks involved in 
terms of information asymmetries.   
(ii) Each group consists of members with some information about each other but 
the information is not complete, therefore prompting the need for some rules 
of conduct within each group. 
(iii) Each individual in the group has their own utility maximization function that 
may not necessarily be in line with other utility functions of other group 
members.   
(iv) The microfinance institution embraces a market approach in the supply for 
loans and has a production function that aims at maximizing revenue through 
loan repayments subject to costs of dealing with many poor borrowers.  
These assumptions would imply that there are user costs both on the microfinance 
institutions and for individual participants within the joint lending groups. User costs for 
microfinance participants include all expenses and opportunity costs, fixed and variable, 
which arise due to being a member of a joint liability-borrowing group. While user costs 
for microfinance institutions include all expenses and opportunity costs, fixed and 
variable, that arise due to availing financial services to economically risky clients. In 
New Development Economics, user costs are considered to be of substantial interest for 
development finance. 
 
In light of the for going discussion, the joint lending group is be perceived as a legal 
entity, in which the members are jointly responsible for the costs and benefits arising out 
of loan acquisitions, uses and repayments8. In this section we strive to understand why 
the joint lending groups behave the way they do. This is particularly important in 
understanding the consequences of the preferred delinquency controls both by the lenders 
                                                 
8
 Joint lending groups stand to save time and money if every one invested in the “right” projects and repaid 
their loans on time. 
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and clients. This understanding would help policy makers to design and implement 
policies that support microfinance as a poverty reduction tool among the economically 
disadvantaged population.  
 
The theory of transactions costs may hold a key to understanding the operations of a joint 
lending group as an institution. There are three main assumptions underlying transactions 
cost theory. The first assumption is that Individuals behave in an opportunistic manner. 
This is so because there exists an asymmetry of information between business-partners in 
a way that information may be passed on incompletely or not at all. This scenario allows 
that in case of goal conflicts individuals adopt opportunistic behaviors. The second 
assumption is that individuals are characterized by bounded rationality. Bounded 
rationality is due to lack of competence, knowledge and information processing 
capabilities in all necessarily areas and as such human individuals are not always able to 
act in a rational manner even if they plan to do so. Due to bounded rationality it is 
impossible to write complete contracts that take care of every possible environmental 
state or action of transaction partners.  And thirdly, uncertainty and specificity of 
investments necessary to carry out transactions are relevant factors. Investment 
specificity refers to possible alternate use of investments made.  
 
Microfinance borrowers within a joint liability group are the decision makers and are 
assumed to behave in a way consistent with bounded rationality, in that they consider a 
restricted range of alternatives but in a rational way. They also may behave 
opportunistically in some situations. However when making such a decision, they weigh 
the costs and benefits of defaulting from the expected behavior. Finally, individual group 
members may have varying preference for risk. As with opportunism, one need not 
assume a single preference for risk among all actors. Transactions within the solidarity 
group operations may be affected by uncertainty and opportunities for opportunistic 
behavior among members. The source of this uncertainty may be either opportunistic 
behavior of the individuals or an uncertain environment. Information may not be 
distributed equally among all individual group members. Where one member has more or 
better information than the other, again the possibility of opportunistic behavior presents 
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itself. Information problems are clearly more acute when the members involved have low 
trust for each other.  
 
The central question is: How is JLL group operations shaped by the attributes of actors 
and transactions in the context of market driven approaches to loan supply? It is 
reasonable to expect that as long as the microfinance institution pursues financial 
sustainability in the absence of a formal insurance agency to shoulder risks of financial 
losses, then most of the insurance costs will be shifted to borrowers. This in practice 
occurs through the forced savings; risk insurance premiums, frequent financial 
transactions with the microfinance institution, as well as weekly meetings to review 
individual progress in loan arrears. Given the lack of empowerment of the poor as well as 
their economic vulnerability, they will accept these conditions as long as they have no 
other alternative and for as long as they still need the money.  There is a danger that joint 
lending groups are likely to prioritize loan repayment since it gives them more utility as a 
group.  
 Rationally we expect that the group as an institution works towards minimizing the costs 
of dealing with an uncertain future given possible opportunistic tendencies of members, 
and the pressure of loan repayment from the microfinance institution. Costs to the 
Lending groups are mainly time costs and financial costs. Research has shown that the 
poor unlike the well off have highly discounted time costs. This implies that joint liability 
groups being composed mainly of poor people may discount their time costs and pursue 
to minimize their financial costs.  This will indeed raise the efficiency in loan repayment 
to the lending institution. There rises a very important empirical question: Is it 
statistically the case that the opportunity costs of loan repayment by the poor are 
statistically insignificant to the welfare of the poor? The answer to this question is very 
relevant to enable the policy maker draw regulations for microfinance institution that are 
in line with poverty alleviation objectives.   
Critics would like to argue that individuals in a joint liability borrowing groups would 
rationally wish to maximize on their loan returns through appropriate investments. On the 
contrary, even the concept of “appropriate investment” is not an individual decision in a 
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joint liability borrowing group since peers would like to see their group members 
investing in programs that convince them that it will be possible for them to repay the 
loans in time. Another reason why it is not possible to maximize JLL loan productivity 
through “appropriate investments” for borrowers especially those without other sources 
of income is because of the frequent financial transaction with the microfinance 
institution. The frequent transactions discourage borrowers from investing in long term 
projects even though they may have better returns because the borrowers may risk 
default. Default by one member is costly to the group as a whole. In this case it is 
possible to shift priorities of borrowers from maximization of incomes through 
appropriate investments to priorities of loan repayment. The following figure attempts to 
capture this conceptualization: 
Figure 9: Operations Lending group as an institution 
Threat of opportunistic 
behaviour by members 
Strict Rules to ensure 
individual loan repayment 
Voluntary or involuntary 
compliance by members 
Joint lending Group 
(With limited information 
about individuals) 
Loan 
Repayment 
Microfinance 
Institution 
Financial sustainability, 
Maximize outreach and 
maximize revenues 
Discounted time costs, minimize 
financial costs 
COSTS TO 
BORROWERS? 
Impact on household 
income? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  RESULTS AND DISUSSION 
4.1 Qualitative and descriptive analysis 
Introduction 
The reason for this qualitative section in a study that is mainly considered quantitative in 
nature was to provide more information of the underlying issues pertaining to household 
participation in microfinance programs in order to understand and interpret the 
quantitative results. 
The study benefited from a rich qualitative data through focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews. The nature of the interviews and discussions was open ended, 
exploratory and focused on the practical issues of joint liability lending and their effect 
on household income. This section relies mainly on inductive reasoning process and basic 
exploratory statistics to interpret and structure the meanings that can be derived from the 
data collected. The main objective of this section is to use qualitative data in a process of 
inductive reasoning within the context of economic theory in order to generate ideas 
(hypothesis generating), as opposed to hypothesis testing. Much of the qualitative 
analysis is focused on the structural organization of the joint liability lending (JLL) group 
as an institution and was mainly interested on three core issues: First, the role of 
individual group members in enabling each others´ access to credit; Second:  Intra- 
household credit allocation to different household expenditures including 
entrepreneurship; and finally the overall effects of the credit on households´ ability to 
improve their incomes.   
4.1.1 General descriptive statistics for both microfinance participants and non 
participants 
Many microfinance institutions particularly those that serve the poorer clients purport to 
have a social mission. Their purported goal is to help in the fight against poverty by 
empowering households to raise their incomes and improve their standards of living in a 
version similar to the one explained in section 2.2. The general nature and the extent of 
poverty in society has been described as engendered, and some researchers and policy 
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makers describe poverty has having a “woman’s face”. This is because empirical studies 
have shown that many more women than men tend to be more economically 
disadvantaged. In their mission to reduce household poverty and also as confirmed by 
this study, micro credit institutions target more women than men. In the study area one 
microfinance institution: the Kenya women Finance Trust (KWFT) lend exclusively to 
women. Not only is lending to women believed to have an overall greater impact on 
household welfare in terms of nutrition and education, but also women have been found 
to be better payers. Lending to women is therefore believed to contribute not only to 
alleviating household poverty and improving human capital formation, but it is also 
efficient in terms of sustaining microfinance institutions by ensuring good repayment 
rates.  
In this study 75 % of the random sample of all the borrowers was female while 25% was 
male. In some microfinance institutions like the Grameen Bank which is the biggest 
microfinance institution in terms of outreach, 96% of their clients are women. The 
difference in the clients’ gender proportions between the Grameen Bank and our study 
sample could be explained by the socioeconomic and cultural context that determine 
group formations and access to loans. The following is a table of important socio 
economic statistics for both microfinance participants and non participants 
 
Table 2: Household Socio economic statistics  
 
Microfinance 
participants 
Non 
Participants  
Mean age of household head 34.81 35 
Mean household size 4.30 4.10 
% of female headed households 46.80 22.20 
Mean years of formal education for 
household head 
10.2 10.05 
Source: field data 
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About 88 % of all the respondents both participants and non participants said that 
business was their main occupation, while the rest were civil servants, i.e teachers, casual 
laborers and peasant farmers. This result seems to be against the expectations of a typical 
rural setting, where the majority of households are expected to be relying on farming as 
their main occupation. How ever this could be explained by the fact that prior to the study 
the eastern province of Kenya and other arid and semiarid regions had suffered a 
prolonged drought for about 5 years. Many peasant farmers had therefore looked for 
other opportunities like entrepreneurship to earn a living. Of all the enterprises studied, 
85 % were located within the main shopping centers while the rest were local canteens 
and tea kiosks. About 58% of the entrepreneurs operated small retail shops and tailoring 
shops while the rest were involved in micro entrepreneurship activities like food vending 
11%, and vegetable / grocery stands (30%). 
 
All the three major microfinance institutions found in the study area were officially 
giving loans for only micro entrepreneurship related activities. Borrowers were expected 
to either boost existing business or to start one with the microfinance loans. However, 
there was no strict enforcement of this regulation and it was possible for individuals to 
join a joint lending group and access loans for what ever reasons as long as they were 
accepted in to the group by the existing peers. 
 
4.1.2 Household access to credit through Joint Liability Lending 
In order to accept a new member in to their group, peers only considered the ability to 
repay loans by the prospective member. Group members judged the ability to repay the 
loans by new members depending on two criteria; the first is ownership of assets that act 
as “collateral” to the group and the second is the ability to provide the group with a 
guarantor incase the borrower’s collateral falls short in the future. Non repayment by an 
individual client because of death was formally insured by the microfinance institution 
and every borrower contributed to this insurance. The other risks due to non repayment   
were borne jointly by the group. 
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The provision of a guarantor and “collateral” is just the beginning of the vetting process 
by peers. The next vetting hurdles are purely financial: they begin with the group 
membership fee, ranging from a minimum of Ksh 500 (7 USD) to 1000 (14 USD) 
depending on the prospective group. Another charge is the pass book fee (a fee charged 
by the microfinance institution in order to issue a passbook to the borrower) which ranges 
between Kshs 65 (1 USD) to 200 (2,5 USD) depending on the lending institution. A 
charge of about 1% of the loan applied for by the client is also paid to the bank as 
insurance fee incase of death of the client. Every individual borrower must become a 
member of the microfinance institution and for this they must pay another 150 Ksh (2 
USD) as membership fee to the microfinance institution.  
 
The prospective member was also required to join the rotating credit arrangement of the 
solidarity group and start by paying the contribution for the current recipient. Focus 
group discussions revealed that membership to a rotating credit group was also a 
precondition for being a member of a microfinance institution. Different solidarity groups 
had different contributions for each recipient per month that range from between Ksh 500 
(7 USD) to 1000 (14 USD). After fulfilling all the financial requirements related to 
participation in a joint lending group, the prospective borrower had to pay in advance the 
first monthly loan repayment  installment even before the loan is advanced; failure to 
which the loan could not be processed. The actual amount paid for the first loan 
installment depended on the amount of loan sought and the interest rate. The interest rates 
for the three microfinance institutions studied ranged between 24 to 30 %. 
 
 In case a new member was perceived to be weak in terms of their ability to repay, they 
were advised by the group members to be submitting their loan arrears to the group 
treasurer on a weekly basis. The treasurer would in turn keep all the installments till the  
 
end of the month and then pay to the microfinance institution on behalf of the group. To 
understand the logic behind the already discussed tedious list of endless “bills” that a 
poor client has to pay before they can access any funds, one must consider the risks 
involved with dealing with low income persons while at the same time pursuing financial 
 80 
sustainability for the microfinance institution. Whereas it is true that microfinance 
institutions have to ensure their own sustainability if they were to continue serving their 
clients in the future; there are social questions that may need to be addressed. For 
example: To what extent does the transfer of financial risks to the poor borrowers under 
strict market oriented business imperatives really are meant to help the poor?  
About 70% of the participants surveyed were not able to raise the initial financial price to 
become microfinance clients from their own pre existing income sources.  Majority of the 
borrowers (about 80 %) relied on bridge loans from friends and relative with the promise 
to pay back when their loans get processed by the microfinance institution. The other 
20% relied on financial transfers mainly from own older children or from close relatives.  
 
4.1.3 Loan repayment and debt recovery procedures 
Group meetings to discuss repayment issues among other issues like debt recovery and 
information sharing took place on a weekly basis.  Other group activities like seminars 
and trainings were also discussed in the meeting that was usually attended by a loan 
officer. Focus group discussions as well as participant observation revealed that the top 
objective for the loan officer to be present at the group meeting was to primarily ensure 
that all due loan installments were collected.   
 
The loan officer would not agree to end a meeting until all the installments had been 
repaid. In many times it took the group officials (chairperson, treasurer and secretary) to 
use the groups’ joint funds to pay up for those who could not submit their contributions 
on time. The joint group fund came from regular contributions from every member, and 
also from fines paid by members who could not pay their loan installments on time or 
those members who were late in attending meetings. If the funds were not enough to 
settle the outstanding arrears the group officials would borrow from other sources. The 
group considered repayment of any outstanding loan installment for any of their members 
as most urgent in order to avoid the consequences imposed by the microfinance 
institution. If a group did not repay any loan installment on time the microfinance 
institution would not only impose fines but may also stop lending to the group altogether 
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and cease their compulsory savings. Based on this consequence, joint liability groups will 
naturally exclude very poor borrowers from their groups for fear of their eminent default.  
 
If the group happened to pay a loan installment (s) on behalf of a defaulting colleague 
they will first pressurize them to reimburse the group and coerce them to pay the 
appropriate fine. If this did not work, the group would result to impounding the assets of 
the defaulted borrower till every coin is repaid. Literally speaking there was no way a 
borrower would default without repercussions.  It was also not possible for every member 
in the group to decide to default at the same time and thereby avoid peer sanctions. 
Microfinance institutions had devised such a plan as to avoid moral hazard using several 
techniques: First, the microfinance institution does not give loans to every member at the 
same time, the institution delays the turns in releasing loans such that at every moment 
some group member has already paid or is almost finishing or is just beginning their loan 
repayment. That way there is always pressure from those who have already repaid to 
those that are beginning their loan repayments to pay up. The second reason why it would 
be difficulty for a group member (s) to default without repercussion  is that; incase of 
default by an individual group member,  every other individual member risks their forced 
monthly savings which could be legally seized by the microfinance institutions. 
Successful microfinance institutions dealing with poor borrowers have managed very 
high repayment rates up to 97 % and most times up to 99% or more. On the other hand,  
the poor may not necessarily be repaying their loans because they have improved their 
incomes, rather they could be repaying because they must pay. The ability for the poor to 
repay should therefore not be “a big worry” to the policy maker. What should instead be 
the “big worry” to the policy maker is the social costs at which these loans are being 
repaid.   
 
4.1.4 Uses of micro credit loans by households  
Rural areas in Kenya are characterized by low household incomes. This implies a low 
demand for goods and services and therefore limited markets for rural micro 
entrepreneurs. Given this scenario, micro-entrepreneurs must make difficulty decisions in 
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terms of loans uses. More often than not micro entrepreneurs must face the question of 
whether to invest all the loan money in the enterprises given the business prospects or to 
use some of it to settle immediate domestic needs.  The following table explains how the 
household allocates the loan money. Domestic use in this case includes such expenditures 
as debt repayment among other basic but urgent household expenditures like food and 
medication and sometimes school fees for children who have already been send home 
from school. “Entrepreneurship use” in this context refers to loan uses that involve 
investment in some household entrepreneurship activity. 
 
Table 3: Household credit allocation 
Borrowers (%) Domestic Uses 
(% of total loan) 
Entrepreneurship use (% of 
total loan) 
5 100 0 
5 75 25 
37 25 75 
20 20 80 
33 ~0  100 
Source: Field data 
From a social point of view, it is not be necessarily bad that households would borrow to 
smooth consumption. While on the other hand, saving opportunities for poor households 
would offer more viable alternative since they would equip households to manage income 
volatility without the stress of debt.  
The next question in this study relates to how the participants were repaying the loans 
given that majority of the respondents did not use them for the expected entrepreneurship 
purpose. The following is a summary of the results regarding to household loan 
repayment:  
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Table 4: Household  Loan Repayment  
Method of Loan repayment Borrowers affected (%) 
Duress 62 
Property confiscation by peers 4 
Sale of pre-existing property 17 
Business Profits 17 
              Source: Field data 
Repayment by duress in this context meant repayment merely due to excessive peer pressure. 
Duress coping mechanisms included entrepreneurship de- capitalization and bridge loans. 
Property confiscation by peers in this case meant that the group member lost some assets 
through peer confiscation. In case of non repayment by a member, peers resorted to 
confiscation of the assets pledged by the individual at the time of joining the joint liability 
borrowing group. Domestic animals (cows, goats chicken etc), house furniture, and 
electronic goods and sometimes clothing were some of the major assets sold or confiscated to 
repay the loans. Sale of pre existing property meant that the individual chose to sale their 
own assets to repay the loan, other than wait for the peers to impound the property. 
Repayment by means of business profits meant that the respondents were able to invest and 
reap returns and were therefore able to repay from business profits.   
 
All group members were responsible for loan recovery from any individual defaulter in their 
group. Two of the three microfinance institutions experienced and maintained almost 100% 
loan repayments through out the study period while the third microfinance institution 
experienced between 90 to 75% repayment rates during the study period and the trend was on 
the decline.  Focus group discussions revealed that the financial burdens for participants were 
so overwhelming to the extent that members more often than not found themselves in viciuos 
debt circles. The participants had to borrow to conceal debts and there by postphone the debt 
problems until they finally could not borrow anymore and it was time to face the “debt 
monster”, a scenario that was in most cases fatal to household welbeing.  By the 18th month 
of the study period,  33% of initial microfinance particpartnts had dropped out citing 
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repayment problems while surprisingly another 10% of non participants had already joined 
the borrowing groups. New groups were also forming.  
4.1.5 Sources of labour for micro enterprises 
In light of the forgoing discussion, it is possible to understand that being a participant in a 
joint lending group has serious implications in terms of opportunity and financial costs. The 
next question is: How do the participants manage their micro enterprises in terms of labour 
requirements during group meetings which are held on a weekly basis as well as during loan 
recovery activities? To answer this question we compare the labour utilization statistics for 
all micro entrepreneurs regardless of their participation in micro credit programs.  
 
Table 5: Utilization of labor by rural micro- enterprises 
 
Enterprises by 
Microfinance participants 
Enterprises by 
Non Participants  
Utilization of 
unpaid labor 
33% 19% 
Labor from own 
children 
17% 9% 
Paid labour 25% 39% 
Source: Field data 
4.1.6 Household income changes before and after microfinance intervention 
The following table describes household poverty indices both at the beginning and at the 
end of the survey: 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: W elfare changes for both participants and non participants  
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 Beginning of Survey End of Survey 
 % Poor % Non poor % Poor % Non poor 
 Microfinance 
participants  
56 44 52 48 
Non participants  61 39 59 41 
 
During the period of the study, positive welfare changes were observed for both 
participants of microfinance and non participants. Later in the quantitative analysis the 
impact of microfinance “per se” on the change in household income will be measured.  
In light all of the for going discussion, there are several questions that future research in 
the area would help to address: What is the cost benefit analysis of microfinance 
participation by poor borrowers? Is participation in microfinance programs by the poor 
always socially benefiting? Is it justified to invest big amounts of resources toward micro 
credit programs as compared to other poverty alleviation initiatives?  
 
4.1.5 Concluding remarks 
The for going analysis has mainly dwelled on the issue of access to loan, uses and 
repayment and changes on household income before and after the microfinance 
intervention. Statistically it is not possible to make any concrete conclusions concerning 
impact of microfinance at this point but several hypotheses about implicit costs to 
borrowers and risk management by microfinance institutions have been raised so far.  
 
Microfinance institutions serving the poor operate in very risky contexts. Most of the risk 
arises due to the economic disadvantage of their clients and also because these 
institutions work in areas with poor or no basic infrastructure. Aiming for sustainability 
in such a context would involve a question of risk sharing between the microfinance 
institution and the clients. In the present scenario, many of the costs pertaining to risk 
have been shifted to the borrowers who bear them as long as they need the loans and have 
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no other alternatives. The shifting of costs to the poor should call for a policy to address 
over indebtness and debt management by the poor. Although the issue of indebting the 
poor has been raised in the section, it has not been conclusively discussed and the actual 
causes have also not been conclusively determined. However it has been identified that 
loan repayment pressure contributes to the household debt levels. This is particularly so 
given the finding that borrowers acquire bridge debts to conceal due debts. Excess debt 
can deplete household capital assets as well as other basic livelihood assets, thereby 
leaving the household exposed and vulnerable. Excess debt can also increase the 
propensity for financial crises.  
 
The poor mainly go for loans with different motives; some may be looking for immediate 
funds to smooth consumption while other households may be interested in operating 
small scale enterprises. On the practical side of things, it has been easy for rural 
households to acquire capital for micro enterprises through microfinance. However one 
major challenge that still remains unsolved is the issue of effective demand for the 
products. Without the demand for goods and services, then the potential for micro 
entrepreneurship to improve household incomes is highly compromised.  
4.2 Determinants of Participation in Micro credit Programs 
Introduction 
The reasons why the poor go for joint liability microfinance loans can be put under two 
broad categories: The first is that the household could be looking for immediate survival 
funds for the household since no other opportunity is available. Entrepreneurship which 
is as a result of household lack of better alternatives to raise income shall be hence forth 
referred to as “survival driven entrepreneurship”. Assuming that poor households 
discount the future highly; it is the case that household decisions in this context will only 
lay emphasis on the present household socioeconomic conditions, with the “hope” that 
the future will be “equally met”. But not all households would be “survival driven 
entrepreneurs”. The second reason why a household would opt for joint liability lending 
microfinance loans would be to acquire credit; but not necessarily because the credit is 
the only way they could ever make a living for the time being but because the household 
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views credit as an opportunity to acquire the capital that is needed to exploit a “good” 
income generating idea. This will mainly depend on the household managerial and risk 
taking capabilities. This kind of approach to credit and entrepreneurship we call 
“opportunity driven entrepreneurship”. Overall each household decides whether to join a 
borrowing group based on individual preferences and prevailing household income 
conditions. Households join the JLL groups and access loans when utility of participation 
exceeds utility without participation.  
 
4.2.1 The econometric model  
The driving factors for household decision of whether to participate or not to participate 
in JLL micro credit programs are assumed to be socio economic considerations. It is not 
straight forward to measure household desperation level as a determinant for both 
survival and opportunity driven entrepreneurship, because of variable measurement 
problems that are likely to arise. Conventionally, it is possible to proxy the determinants 
of household participation in to JLL micro credit programs using measurable household 
socioeconomic variables. Rationally households are assumed to maximize utility and they 
would participate in JLL micro credit programs if the utility of participation outweighs 
the utility of non participation.  
The expected utility of participation in JLL micro credit programs is determined by the 
individual characteristics of the programs as perceived by the borrowers, the 
characteristics of the borrower, the intended micro business, and the business 
environment. These can be depicted as blocks of vectors. 
( ) ),,( αβpi mrkXBfMPEM iii ==                                                                          (13) 
Where E denotes expectation and Pi denotes individual probability 
Mi  is a discrete dependent variable that equals 1 if the household i participates in JLL 
micro credit programs 0 otherwise 
piB  is a vector of perceived benefits of participation in JLL micro credit programs  
βX  is a vector of household characteristics 
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αmrk  is a vector of village characteristics. In this context village characteristics are 
assumed to be homogeneous in terms of infrastructure and social facilities. The only 
significant difference in socioeconomic facilities and infrastructure is found at the major 
shopping centers that attract both travelers and locals for a variety of business activities. 
To capture the impact the economic changes in the major shopping centers may have on 
surrounding households, we use the distance for different household   access to these 
major shopping centers that are located along the main highway as proxy for market 
access for micro enterprise goods and services.  
Assume that business set up costs for micro financed businesses are minimal. Then the 
decision to participate in JLL micro credit programs is determined by household 
socioeconomic characteristics, perceived benefits, as well as village characteristics.   
By employing the model as specified in equation 13 above, the Logit model can be 
applied to provide information to the determinants of household participation in JLL 
micro credit programs.  
( )iiiiii mrkXBfMPME αβpi ++== )()(                                                                          14 
 
Where iM  denotes individual household participation as a discrete variable, E denotes 
expectation, and Pi denotes individual probability, and iX  denotes a vector of individual 
household socioeconomic characteristics that can be hypothesized to affect participation. 
imrk   denotes individual household market access and it is proxied using individual 
household distance to the nearest main shopping centre along the main highway, iβ  
denotes perceived benefits of participation by individual households, and αpi ,  and β  are 
coefficients to be estimated. The Logit model is usually specified as follows: 
( ) ( )
mrkXBA
mrkXBA
ii ii
ii
e
eMPME
αβpi
ββpi
+++
+++
+
==
1
                                                                         (15) 
 
( ) ( ) ,1== ii MPME  if the individual participates in JLL micro credit programs 
, 0 otherwise. 
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Equation 15 can be expressed as a linear equation where  
 
E εαβpi ++++= iiii mrkXBAM )(                                                                                (16) 
A is a constant and ∈i  1,2,3,……….n 
and ε  is a white noise error term.  
 
The following table shows a list and the definitions of variables that  have been used in 
the actual model 
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Table 7: Variables used in the participation model 
Variable  Name  Definition 
Partc (M) Discrete dependent 
variable  
Whether a household participates joint 
liability lending micro credit programmes or 
not. M=1 if household participates, 0 
otherwise.  
Mrk Distance to the 
nearest main 
shopping centre 
along the highway 
It used as a  to proxy household market access 
Age Age of head of 
household 
In years 
Sizehh Size of household Number of people living and cooking together 
in one household 
Sex Gender of household 
head 
Male or female. Sex =1 if male, 0 otherwise 
Edu Level of education of 
household head 
Number of years spent in formal schooling by 
head of household 
Inc Household income Index of household income based on household 
access to and ownership of assets. 
Employ Paid employment Availability of regular income from paid 
employment in the household. Employ =1 if 
either spouse is employed, 0 otherwise 
Agesq Squared age of head 
of household 
 
Sizehhsq Squared size of 
household 
 
Incsq Squared household 
income 
 
Edusq Squared number of 
years spend in 
formal education by 
head of household 
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4.2.2 Results 
The following table shows the results of the logistic model: 
Table 8: Determinants of household participation in JLL microfinance programs (Results) 
   
Marginal effects 
Partc. (M) Coefficient Z 
dx
dy
  
Z 
Mrk -.6659435** 
(.2751305) 
-2.42 -.157874** 
(.06422) 
-0.014 
Age .027111 
(.0936568) 
0.29 .0064649 
(.02233) 
0.772 
Sizehh .3738512 
(.2361079) 
1.58 .0891482 
(..0488) 
0.113 
Edu .1530966 
(.2047127) 
0.75 .0365073 
(.0488) 
0.454 
Inc .885462** 
(.0389605) 
0.018 .1713025** 
(.06929 
0.017 
Employ -.928127*** 
(.2860016) 
-3.25 -.212818*** 
(.06173) 
0.001 
Agesq -.0004321 
(.0202818) 
-0.37 -.0047909 
(.00028) 
0.713 
Sizehhsq -.0200909 
(.0202818) 
-0.99 -.0000425 
(.00483) 
0.322 
Incsq -.0001783 
(0004225) 
-0.027** -.0000425 
(.0001) 
0.073** 
Edusq -.0072338 
(.0111873) 
-0.65 -.001725 
(.00267) 
0.518 
Constant -2.88355 -1.53   
N= 404 
Prop >F=0.0029 
Key*** Significant at 1 %, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
Source: Field data 
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.  
 
The results indicate that participation in to JLL micro credit programs in rural areas is 
significantly explained by access to market, household income, and the presence of 
regular household income in to the household. Households that live close to the market 
are likely to participate than households that live far off. This could be explained by the 
presence of a market along the main highway shopping centers.   Households with a 
regular household income are not likely to participate in JLL micro credit programs. On 
the other hand, Household participation in joint liability lending programmes increases 
with household income, but there is a limit beyond which participation decreases with 
household income. These results have a big implication on poverty reduction policies. 
For example, if the goal of policy is to reach the very poor households then a market 
driven micro credit program may not be the policy of choice since it will mainly reach the 
better off poor, missing out on the target.     
4.3 What Determines the Loan Size that a Household Desires to Take  
Introduction 
Studies have shown that the size of loans that poor household acquire through micro 
credit programs are very important determinants of the impact of those loans on the 
household welfare. For example Mayoux (2002) argued that gender relations in the 
household made the issue of the loan size acquired by women in particular through the 
microfinance programs very important for the determination of the impact of that loan on 
household welfare. Mayoux (2002) argued that poor women acquired small loan sizes; 
due to gender relations in the household their husbands reduced their financial support to 
the household because of the impression that the wife has some extra resources through 
the microfinance programs. This meant that some of the loan money would be diverted to 
meet some household expenditure that would have been catered for by her husband if she 
had not taken the loan. Mayoux (2002) argued that in most cases the balance after these 
household expenditures was so small that it was impossible for the women to invest in 
significant projects that could improve their household welfare. According to Mayoux 
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(2002), the end result of the credit for such households was a matter of mere debt to the 
women without any significant changes in welfare.  
 
In his study, Coleman (2006) found that the impact of microfinance on household income 
was not statistically significant for poorer households but he noted significant impacts for 
the wealthier households who were also committee members of micro credit programs 
particularly on wealth accumulation. The loan sizes accessed by poorer households were 
a big issue in Coleman’s (2006) study. Coleman (2006) argued that the loan sizes were 
too small to make any significant differences in household welfare. The size of loans 
even prompted some women to leave the microfinance programs arguing that the loans 
were too small for any meaningful income generating activity (Coleman 2006). Coleman 
argues that one reason why wealthier borrowers may have experienced larger impacts 
was because they could commandeer larger loans.  
Households determine the loan size they would like to take based on their prevailing 
socio economic conditions and also depending on what they needed to invest the money 
in. The official policy of the microfinance institutions in the study area was to give loans 
to households who already had existing businesses. Even households who did not want to 
reveal their real preferences with the loans had to misinform the microfinance institution 
that they indeed intent to use the funds for some entrepreneurship activity.  The study 
found that households were in complete control of the allocation of the loan funds in 
what ever expenditures they deemed appropriate, as long as they assured their peers that 
they would repay. On the other hand, the study also found that households were not 
necessarily in control of the quantity of loan they demanded and acquired from the 
microfinance institutions. This is mainly because group members will not agree to sign 
papers for a particular quantity of a loan whose recipient capability to repay was 
contested. Credit rationing by way of credit ceilings by the micro credit organizations 
also served to limit the amount of credit that a household could access.  
 
It is not just the visible characteristics that matter for the household acquisition of a 
particular loan size. In reality it is hard to observe, leave alone measure accurately 
household managerial or risk taking capabilities which are very significant in determining 
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the loan size that a household acquires. It is also difficulty to capture statistically the role 
played by peers in determining the loan sizes acquired by other group members. 
However, Some household characteristics like age, education level or the size of 
household among others that affect loan sizes are easy and straight forward to measure.  
 
In reality we observe households and the loan sizes that they take. What we do not know 
is the extent of biases in household selection of loan sizes. To control for possible 
selection biases it is very important to include in the analysis households that do not 
participate in the microfinance programs.  In this case it is better to use a data set that is 
censored in that there is full information in terms of loan sizes for households that 
participate in the microfinance programs; But there may be no information on loan sizes 
for households that do not participate.  Modeling this problem requires the use of a model 
that is able to take care of the suspected selection biases by use of censored data.   
 
4.3.1 Economic and Econometric models of household decision with regard to Loan 
size 
 In order to take care of selection biases for the household decision in loan sizes the 
problem is modeled using the Heckman procedure. The data includes both microfinance 
participants and non participants. In the regression model, loan size is used as the 
dependent variable. The dependent variable in this case will be censored for the non 
microfinance participants since we do not have their full information. In the selection 
model we shall use participation in microfinance program as a dummy dependent 
variable that equals 1 for participants of microfinance programs, zero otherwise. The 
probability of participating in a microfinance program depends on household 
characteristics that also include observed and unobserved variables.  
 
An individual household would like to participate in the microfinance programs in order 
to maximize utility (U), which depends on household consumption (C) among other 
characteristics.   
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),,(,( φZXhCUU =                                                                                                       (17) 
 
 C is consumption and it is a continuous variable. The function h(.) reflects household 
preferences to loan sizes and depends on observables, X and Z , and unobservables  φ . 
Each household participating in the microfinance programs has three types of attributes, 
first, there is a vector X of characteristics, such as education, and household size among 
other variables that are observable and measurable by the researcher. There are also two 
types of unobservable characteristics; Lµ  represents entrepreneurial capacity, the ability 
to take risks, or managerial capacity and the other standard unobservable that favorably 
impact decision to demand a particular loan size. Hµ  represents characteristics such as 
honesty and other business ethics that are more closely associated with entrepreneurship  
productivity. 
The Econometric Model 
To address the selection bias issue, it is better to use the Heckman procedure for the 
analysis. In the regression equation of the Heckman selection model we estimate the 
household loan sizes (we include both participants and non participants of microfinance 
programs), given the households observable and measurable characteristics as well as 
their unobservable characteristics. In the selection equation we estimate the determinants 
of participation in the microfinance programs. Microfinance institutions impose a trade 
off between what households desires as preferred loan sizes (α ) and the loan sizes 
advanced to the household (Q ). Individual households face a range of (Q, α) pairs, the 
fraction of Q and α, is negotiated prior to actual financing.  
 
The choice is summarized by the expression: 
 
),,,(
,
piµµαα HLXQ=                                                                                              (18) 
 
where pi represents group conditions favorable to receiving the desired loan size. α is 
increasing in X, pi, and the µ’s.  
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The household’s consumption is described by the expression: 
 
),,,().,,,( HLHLM XQgXQC µµµµα=                                                                    (19) 
 
where HLXQg µµα ,,,,,  >0 
 
and ),,,( HLXQg µµ   is expected returns from loan size and they depend on market 
conditions for the goods and services as well as household specific characteristics. 
 
Given the individual household characteristics and market conditions, the maximum 
consumption for a household is the solution of the problem: 
 
MaxQCM =        ),,,(),,,,( .. HMHM XQgXQ µµpiµµα                                                 (20) 
 
 
The solution of this problem is, 
),,,(** piµµ HEXQQ =                                                                                          (21) 
 
The consumption of a household that does not participate in a microfinance program 
depends on its observables, X, and its unobservable characteristics: 
 
),,( HLS XfC µµ=                                                                                                    (22) 
 
These households would like to participate in the micro credit programs if the utility from 
the loans outweighs the utility without the loans.  i.e if: 
 
0)0,()1).,,(*),(( >−= SM CUXZhQCUM φ                                                               (23) 
 
Or the reduced form 
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>= ),,,,(~~ φµµpi HLZXMM 0                                                                            (24) 
The econometric model of household decision concerning loan sizes is obtained by 
linearizing equations (21) and (24): 
 
QQQXQ εpiγβ ++=*                                                                                                 (25a) 
 
 
MMM ZXM δpiγβ ++=~                                                                                             (25b) 
 
Where X, pi, and Z are vectors of observables, and MM γβ ,  and Mδ  ),(( MQK ∈ are the 
respective vectors of coefficients. 10~ =⇔> MM  and indicates that a household 
participates in microfinance programs. The error terms in (25a) and (25b) can be 
expressed in terms of the unobservable ,, HL µµ  and φ  , and constants a,b, c, d and e: 
 
HLQ ba µµε +=                                                                                                       (26a) 
 
 
φµµε ec HLM ++=                                                                                                   (26b) 
 
The selection model is estimated under maximum likelihood, assuming that Mε  and Qε  
are distributed bivariate normal. When Mε  and Qε  are distributed bivariate normal: 
 
[ ] [ ]11| =++== MAXMQE QQQQ εpiγβ  
 
( ) ( )MMMMQQQQ ZXX δpiγβλεεpiγβ ++++= ,cov                                                      (27) 
 
Where ( )MMM ZX δpiγβλ ++  is the inverse mills ratio. 
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Because Z is included in (25b) but not (25a), the model is identified (in addition to the 
identification through nonlinearity). The strength of the identification assumption is 
gauged from a test of the joint significance of the variables included in Z. The covariance 
between the error terms can be expressed as: 
 
( ) ( )φµµµεε edba HLLMQ +++= cov,cov  
 
( ) φµφµµµµµ δδδδδ ,,2,2 HLHHLL beaebdbcadac +++++=                                               (28) 
 
When (28) is positive we have positive selection: On net, the unobservable associated 
with desire for credit are correlated with the unobservable affecting the propensity to 
attain a given loan size. In this case, households that already have credit have more 
favorable unobservable than households that do not have credit. However, if, say, c is 
sufficiently negatively, or if the two µ’s are sufficiently negative correlated, then we have 
negative selection. Then, households that receive credit   have less favorable 
unobservables than households that do not. A test for the presence of selection is a test of 
whether: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0/,cov, ≠≡ MQMQMQ δδεεεερ ε                                                                            (29) 
 
While we cannot estimate the parameters, a, b, c, d and e individually, we can conjecture 
about the sign and relative magnitude of (28) (and therefore (29) in various cases. For 
instance, by assumption, Lµ   and  Hµ  increase value in entrepreneurship and φ  
measures preferences for credit. This implies that a, b and e > 0, respectively (Heckman 
1990). 
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Table 9: Variables used in the model for household decisions in to loan sizes. 
Variable  Name  Definition 
Ince  Frequency of 
household borrowing 
within the period 
 Ince. Is used as a proxy of dynamic incentives 
(promise of bigger after repayment of earlier 
loan). It is proxied by the number of times that 
a household has already borrowed from the 
microfinance institution.   
mrk Distance to the 
nearest main 
shopping centre 
along the highway 
It used as a  to proxy household market access 
Age Age of head of 
household 
In years 
Sizehh Size of household Number of people living and cooking together 
in one household 
Sex Gender of household 
head 
Male or female. Sex =1 if male, 0 otherwise 
Edu Level of education of 
household head 
Number of years spent in formal schooling by 
head of household 
Inc Household income Index of household income based on household 
access to and ownership of assets. 
Agesq Squared age of head 
of household 
 
Sizehhsq Squared size of 
household 
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4.3.2 Results 
The following table summarizes the econometric results (regression model) 
Table 10: Determinants of household loan size decisions (regression model) 
   
Marginal effects 
Variable  Coef. Z  Z 
Loansize     
Mrkt -.232728*** 
(.0851112 ) 
-2.73 -.232728** 
(.08511) 
-2.73 
Ince .231429*** 
(.0375725) 
6.12 .2304376*** 
(.03763) 
6.12 
Age .0499669* 
(.0304005) 
1.71 .0533895* 
(.03114) 
1.71 
Agesq -.000725* 
(.0004142) 
-1.81 -.0007704* 
(.00043) 
-1.81 
Sizesq -.0032255 
(.0058512) 
-0.55 -.0032775 
(.00585) 
-0.55 
Size .0797829 
(.0688764) 
1.16 .0800425 
(.06878) 
1.16 
Sex .0345394 
(.0805827) 
0.43 .0339261 
(.08062) 
0.43 
Edu .0034313 
(.0143766) 
0.21 .0030978 
(.01447) 
0.21 
Y .2714206** 
(.1219273) 
2.23 .2737702** 
(.03763) 
2.28 
Constant 7.969119*** 
(.7629369) 
10.45   
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The following table summarizes the econometric results (selection model) 
Table 11: Determinants of household loan size decision (selection model)  
Select Variable Z   
Edu .0127257 
(.0983627) 
0.13   
Age .0132118 
(.0423188) 
0.31   
Employ -.4118695*** 
(.1352713) 
-3.04   
Agesq -.0002798 
(.0005488) 
-0.51   
Edusq -.0008652 
(.0053173) 
-0.16   
 Y2 -.0000364 
(.0000922) 
-0.39   
Y .5049152* 
(.2814681) 
1.79   
Constant -.766464 
(1.148284) 
-1.54   
     
Prob>chi2 0.000    
Chi2 0.60    
Sigma .5621982    
Lambda .2125409    
Key 
*** Significant at 1 %, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
Source: Field data 
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The results indicate that access to market is very significant in explaining the loan sizes 
that household acquire. Households living nearer to the main shopping centers along the 
main highway will acquire significantly larger loan sizes than households living further 
away.  Several reasons could be used to explain this result: The first is access to market 
by such households thus the ability to have bigger enterprises. The second could be that 
households near the main highway shopping centers may have more household incomes 
and thus the ability to convince their peers of their ability to repay bigger loan amounts. 
The age of household head has a significant positive relationship with loan sizes up to a 
certain maximum threshold. Increasing the age of household head beyond this threshold 
starts to have significant negative relationship with household loan sizes. This result 
could relate to household socio economic status. Households headed by younger heads 
may be better off in the rural areas than households headed by a head who is older than a 
given threshold. Dynamic incentives offered by the microfinance institutions have 
positive significant relationship with loan sizes. The more a household stays in the 
microfinance program the larger the loan sizes it can access in the future. This is because 
each time a household repays a loan successfully, they stand to acquire a larger loan the 
next time they borrow. Household income also has a significant positive relationship with 
loan sizes in that wealthier households are also likely to access larger loans.  
The selection model results show that participation in a micro credit program is 
significantly influenced by employment status of spouse or head of household as well as 
household income. Household that have extra regular household incomes are not likely to 
participate in JLL programs. Household wealth has a significant positive relationship 
with Participation in JLL micro credit programs up to a certain threshold. After these 
thresholds households with more wealth are not likely to participate.  Overall the results 
suggest that poorer households that participate in JLL micro credit programs acquire 
smaller loan as compared to other better off participants.   
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4.4 The Impact of Microfinance on Household Income 
Introduction 
Determining whether the benefits of microfinance programs are sustainable and large 
enough to make a dent in the poverty of participants and society at large is important for 
guiding policy (Coleman 2006). However efforts to assess the impact of microfinance 
programs can be biased by non random program placement and participation. This is so 
mainly because microfinance programs tend to be placed in areas where the incidence of 
poverty are high and therefore lack formal banking institutions. Therefore a simple 
comparison of the incidence of poverty in program and non program areas may lead to 
the mistaken conclusion that microfinance programs have increased poverty. In the same 
note, those who participate may self-select into a program based on unobserved traits 
such as entrepreneurial ability. In that case, simply comparing such outcomes as per 
capita consumption or the incidence of poverty between program participants and non 
participants may lead to the mistaken conclusion that the programs have a high impact on 
poverty reduction, when indeed the effects are due to the unobserved abilities of 
participants. Thus the estimated effects may be under, or overestimated depending on the 
type of analysis. Therefore while doing impact studies the endogeneity of microfinance 
program participation and placement must be taken in to account.  Literature suggest that 
this problem could be resolved if the sample includes both participants and non 
participants of microfinance programs, as well as use of fixed village effects.  
4.4.1 Econometric Model 
The initial impulse in impact estimation for microfinance would be to use the coefficient 
of the loan size as the proxy of the impact of microfinance on household income. 
Coleman 1999 correctly points that the demand for loan is highly correlated with 
household income and therefore the coefficient for loan access may be a biased estimator 
of impact. To avoid this pitfall the study uses the coefficient of number of times 
borrowed as an estimator for impact. This estimator has been chosen mainly because, 
unlike the amount borrowed it is exogenous to the household since it depends on first 
how long the microfinance program has been available to the household and that peers in 
a joint liability group determine how many times they would allow one member to 
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borrow. To take care of the problem of endogeneity with respect to village placement, 
village level fixed-effects method with data from both microfinance participant and non 
participants is used. A model used by Coleman 1999 is adapted as follows: 
 
ijtijtijjijtijt TMVXY ηδγβα ++++=                                                                (30) 
 
Where ijtY  is the individual household income. The household resides in village j at time 
t, 
tijX  is a vector of individual household characteristics in village j at time t, jV  is a 
vector of village fixed effects; ijM  is a membership dummy variable equal 1 if household 
ij is selected in to the microfinance program, and 0 otherwise; and 
tijT  is the number of 
times a household has borrowed from the microfinance institution at time t. We also use 
the membership dummy ijM  to proxy the unobservable characteristics that are relevant 
for households to self select in to the microfinance programs, and that might affect 
outcomes. The variable  ijtT  is the variable whose coefficient measures the impact of 
microfinance on household income. In reality it captures the extent of the self selected 
households’ participation in the microfinance programs. For the control households it 
equals zero while for participating members it is positive in varying amounts. The 
inclusion of non participants in the sample combined with the use of fixed effects, 
controls for the possible endogenous programme placement. The model is run using OLS. 
 
It is important to check the results using a different method. Next the study uses, the 
differencing method using two sets of cross-sectional data that was collected for the same 
households at a nine months interval. The variables in equation (30) were measured after 
a time period t where t in this case is 9 months. In this regard the model could be re-
specified as follows:  
 
1111 ++++ ++++= ijtijtijjijtijt TMVXY ηδγβα                                                                        (31) 
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We are interested in estimating the value ofδ , which is the coefficient that captures the 
impact of microfinance on household income. 1+itY is the dependant variable and it is the 
household income. The variables 
1+ijtX  capture household characteristics at time t+1 (and 
a constant term), and jV  is a vector of village characteristics. ijM  is a membership 
dummy that equals one for microfinance participants, zero otherwise. 1+ijtT  is the number 
of times the individual has borrowed at time t+1.  Equation 31 is subtracted from 
equation 30 to obtain: 
 
ijijijij TXY ηδα ∆+∆+∆=∆ …………………………………………………………….32 
 
Where ∆  indicates the difference in the variables between period t and t+1. In this 
equation the village dummies drop out as do the fixed (and unobservable) individual 
specific characteristics.  Equation 32 measures the changes in household income due to 
the impact of microfinance and household characteristics.  
 
Given the sensitivity to instruments used to measure impact of microfinance, there are 
compelling reasons to use alternative approaches to confirm the results. For this purpose 
we propose to introduce time dynamics in the forgoing estimate and estimate a pooled 
data regression model with fixed village and individual effects. The main reason for using 
pooled data over cross-sectional data in impact assessment is because cross-sectional 
results may not be robust. In this model we assume that Current household income 
depends on both current and past characteristics, including access to loans.   
 
                      (33) 
 
Where 1+itY  is the current individual household income ( )itX  is the previous vector of 
individual household characteristics, 1+itX  is a vector of current household 
characteristics, itS  is the previous total loan size that the household acquired in the 
previous period, 1+itS  is the current loan size that the household has acquired from the 
ηγφδβκσϕα ++++++++= ++++ iititjititititit MTTVSSXXY 1111
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microfinance institution, jV  is the village effects, itT  is the variable whose coefficient 
measures the impact of microfinance on household income in the previous period., 1+itT  is 
the variable whose coefficient captures impact in the current period. and η  is the error 
term. We use a participation dummy M to control for unobserved and unmeasured 
household characteristics that determine household income. γφδβκσϕα ,,,,,,,  are 
coefficients to be estimated. We are interested in φ and δ  as the measure of the impact of 
both the current and the previous credit.   The following table defines all the variables 
used in the model:  
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Table 12:  Variables used in the models for measuring impact of microfinance 
Variable  Name  Definition 
Lninc (ln 
Y) 
Log of household income Natural log of household income 
Iamnt Initial amount The amount of loan that the household 
had borrowed by the first period of the 
study 
Lamt Later amount  The amount of loan that the household 
had borrowed by the last period of the 
study 
Impact Variable used for capturing 
impact 
Measured impact of microfinance on 
household income.  
Iimpact Initial impact  Measured impact of microfinance in the 
first period of household borrowing 
Limpact Later Impact  Measured impact of microfinance in the 
last  period of household borrowing 
Partc Participation in 
microfinance programs 
Whether a household participates joint 
liability lending micro credit 
programmes or not. M=1 if household 
participates, 0 otherwise.  
Ppartc. Non dropouts Households that were persistent in 
participating in microfinance 
programmes through put the period of 
the study. Ppartc. Is a dummy variable 
equals 1 if household did not drop out, 
Zero otherwise.  
Mrk Distance to the nearest 
main shopping centre along 
the highway 
It used as a  to proxy household market 
access 
Age Age of head of household In years 
Employ Paid employment Availability of regular income from 
paid employment in the household. 
Employ =1 if either spouse is employed, 
0 otherwise 
Sizehh Size of household Number of people living and cooking 
together in one household 
Sex Gender of household head Male or female. Sex =1 if male, 0 
otherwise 
Edu Level of education of 
household head 
Number of years spent in formal 
schooling by head of household 
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Agesq Squared age of head of 
household 
 
Sizehhsq Squared size of household  
 
4.4.2 Results  
The following table shows the regression results of the first cross sectional analysis of the 
impact of microfinance on household income. The initial period runs up to a period of 9 
months since the household started participating in the microfinance program.  
Table 13: Impact of microfinance on household income (first cross section)  
Variable Coefficient Std.error Z 
Lninc (lnY)    
Age 0.0161776 0.01427 1.13 
Agesq -0.0000115 0.0001786 -0.06 
Sizehh 0.1525696*** 0.0383012 3.98 
Sizehhsq -0.0100133*** 0.0034889 -2.87 
Edu 0.0246523*** 0.0078954 3.12 
Sex 0.113181** 0.048827 2.32 
Mrk -0.2271299*** 0.0471366 -4.82 
Partc. -0.9184083* 0.5520232 -1.66 
Impact 0.0014682 0.0318898 0.05 
lamnt. 0.0933021* 0.0556059 1.68 
Employ 0.0135485 0.0480091 0.28 
Constant 2.603476*** 0.2780794 9.36 
Summary statistics  
R Squared: 0.2808 
Adjusted R squared: 0.2600 
Prob>F: 0.0000 
Key :*** Significant at 1 %, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Source: Field data 
 
The results indicate that there exists a significant positive relationship between the size of 
household and household income up to a certain maximum threshold. Beyond this 
threshold larger households have a significant negative relationship with household 
income. Education level of head of household is also positively related to household 
income. Female headed households tend to have lower incomes than male headed 
households. Access to market significantly increases household incomes. The results also 
show that households participating in joint liability borrowing had significantly lower 
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incomes than non parting households, and that the amount of loan borrowed in the initial 
period has a significant positive relationship with household income. However in this 
study we fail to show that microfinance has significant positive impact on household 
income.   
 
While reading these results it is important to bear in mind that within the last five years 
before the study agriculture was not a main contributor of household incomes due to a 
prolonged drought. Eighty six percent of all the respondents both microfinance 
participants and non participants reported informal micro entrepreneurship as their main 
occupation. While 98 % of all microfinance participants were involved in some micro 
entrepreneurship activity.  
 
The same estimation was repeated again in 18 months with the following results 
 
Table 14: Impact of microfinance on household income (second crossection) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.error T 
Lninc (lnY)    
Age 0.0245318* 0.0139324 1.76 
Agesq -0.0001587 0.0001748 -0.91 
Sizehh 0.1296524*** 0.0375018 3.46 
Sizehhsq -0.0082168** 0.0034177 -2.40 
Edu 0.0147896* 0.0078069 1.89 
Sex 0.0934801* 0.0479336 1.95 
Mrk -0.2160787*** 0.0463472 -4.66 
Partc. -0.4775297 0.5419591 -0.88 
Impact 0.0251584 0.0206003 1.22 
Lamt 0.043944 0.0549016 0.80 
Employ 0.0023608 0.0475067 0.05 
Constant 2.712935*** 0.2724612 9.96 
 
Summary statistics  
R Squared: 0.2514 
Adjusted R squared: 0.2300 
Prob>F: 0.0000 
Key: *** Significant at 1 %, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Source: Field data 
 
 110 
Same as the previous period, there is a significant positive relationship between the size 
of household and household income up to a certain threshold after which larger 
households have a significant negative relationship with household income. Education 
level of head of household is also positively related to household income. Female headed 
households tend to have lower incomes than male headed households. Households that 
have a closer access to the market have significantly more income than households that 
are located far from the market.  Once again we fail to show positive significant impact 
on household income due to participation in microfinance programs.  
 
However after 18 months the following statistical changes have occurred within the same 
households. In the second cross section we fail to show that participants are significantly 
poorer than non participants. At this stage we can not make concrete claims to explain 
why this change has occurred but there are at least two possible explanations. The first is 
that it could be possible that non participants of microfinance programs have become 
poorer or that the participants of microfinance programs have significantly increased their 
incomes.  Further, the results indicate that access to microfinance loans is no longer 
significantly related to household income unlike in the previous period. This could be 
explained from the organizational dynamics of group lending. Initially during group 
formations participants selected each other depending on the ability to repay loans. Once 
a household started to participate it accumulated some forced savings with the 
microfinance institution which they could borrow against. Also unlike in the previous 
period, age of head of household has a significant positive relationship with household 
income; however it is not the case that households headed by older heads are significantly 
poorer than the rest of the population. To explain this finding it may be worthwhile to 
investigate further, one suggestion would be to look further in to the issue of spill over 
effects of microfinance.  
The next step in our impact analysis is to use the difference indifference method to isolate 
the impact of microfinance on household income. This we do by subtracting equation two 
from equation one. In this case the individual fixed effects drop out, so does the village 
fixed effects. It is then possible to measure the changes in household income due to the 
impact of microfinance and changes in household characteristics.  
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Table 15:  Impact of microfinance on household income (difference in difference) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.error T 
inc∆  ( Y∆ )    
impact∆  .6826694 .4805827 1.42 
amt∆  .0000379* .000017 2.23 
Constant 1.481129** .5586783 2.65 
 
Summary statistics  
R Squared: 0.0249 
Adjusted R squared: 0.0201 
Prob>F: 0.0062 
Key:*** Significant at 1 %, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Source: Field data 
 
We are interested in the coefficient of the variable “impact” which is the isolated impact 
of microfinance after controlling for individual and village effects. The results fail to 
show that changes in household income are significantly determined by the impact of 
microfinance.  
So far, cross sectional analysis has constantly failed to show any significant positive 
impact of microfinance on household income. Given the sensitivity to instruments used to 
measure impact of microfinance, there are compelling reasons to use alternative 
approaches to confirm the results. For this purpose we propose to introduce time 
dynamics in the forgoing estimate and estimate a pooled data regression model with fixed 
village and individual effects. The main reason for using pooled data over cross-sectional 
data in impact assessment is because cross-sectional results may not be robust. Using 
pooled cross sectional data instead of single cross sections is very important given that 
pooled data has a time component and is therefore dynamic, making it possible to 
discover new information concerning the impact of microfinance on household income. 
 
 
 
 112 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: Impact of microfinance on household income (pooled data analysis) 
Variable Coefficient Std.error T 
Lninc (ln Y)    
Age .02719* .0139424 1.95 
Agesq -.0001916 .0001745 -1.10 
Sizehh .1289926*** .037953 3.40 
Sizehhsq -.0082905** .0035068 -2.36 
Edu .0142186* .0078653 1.81 
Sex .0899966* .0482221 1.87 
Employ .0064539 .047417 0.14 
Iamnt -.0844438 .074908 -1.13 
Lamnt .1997418** .0699403 2.86 
mrk -.2261517*** 0465774 -4.86 
Partc. -.178806** .5842735 -2.02 
Iimpact -.0385077  .0396536 -0.97 
Limpact .0482254* .0261307 1.85 
Ppartc. .2211252** 0868596 2.55 
Constant 2.675824*** .2726416 9.81 
 
Summary statistics  
R Squared: 0.2751 
Adjusted R squared: 0.2482 
Prob>F: 0.0000 
 
Key: *** Significant at 1 %, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Source: Field data 
The results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the size of 
household and household income up to a certain maximum threshold after which larger 
households begin to have a significant negative relationship with household income. A 
similar relationship also exists between age of household head and income; Education 
level of head of household is also positive and significantly related to household income. 
Female headed households tend to have significantly lower incomes than male headed 
households. Households that have closer access to the market have significantly more 
income than households that are located far from the market.  Participating households 
still tend to have a significantly lower incomes than the rest of the population.  
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We however are able to capture new information from the pooled data regression 
analysis. The impact of microfinance on household income in the “later period” is 
positive and significant. While in the “initial period” we fail to show significant negative 
impacts.  The emerging story is that microfinance will attract the relatively poorer in 
society though not the poorest. If impact of microfinance on household income was to be 
measured within a relatively very short period, there is a possibility to report negative 
impacts for some households though not for all the households. However given time it is 
possible for households participating in microfinance programmes to experience positive 
impacts from microfinance as long as they still find it worthwhile to continue 
participating in the microfinance programs.   
4.5 Vulnerability to poverty by JLL micro credit program participants 
Introduction 
In the for going quantitative analysis sections we have been able to understand why rural 
households participate in JLL programs.  We have also been able to understand the 
determinants of loan sizes that households acquire. And finally so far we have been able 
to measure the impact of microfinance on household income. All the results so far 
generally suggest that the very poor are left out of participation in JLL programs with 
some results suggesting the possibility of a negative impact. However so far we do not 
have concrete empirical reasons to conclusively say that participation in market oriented 
micro credit programs by poor rural households may be a source of vulnerability. 
Empirical studies have suggested the possibility of fuelling vulnerability among 
households by microfinance programs through indebting the poor. Hulme and Mosley 
(1996) found that there exists a trade off between changes in income and vulnerability for 
poor households: Poverty-as measured by income can be reduced by borrowing, but such 
debt can make the poor more vulnerable because of the added risks associated with 
borrowing.  According to Hulme and Mosley (1996) this can be explained by the fact hat 
most joint liability lending institutions treat the poor as an undifferentiated group and 
focus on production credit rather than more diverse credit and saving services that are 
 114 
better suited to improve the economic security of low income households (Hulme and 
Mosley 1996) 
4.5.1 Method for measuring vulnerability 
In our measurement we define vulnerability as expected poverty, or the probability that a 
household falls in to poverty in the future. Our sample size consists of both participants 
and non participants of microfinance programs. The reason why we choose both 
participants and non participants is not only for comparison purposes but also to address 
selection biases. We define the model as follows; Let the vulnerability of household h , 
be vh , and the poverty measure be w. We define the vulnerability of household ih as  
),,( iii Phzwhfvh =                                                                                         (32) 
 
where z  is a relative poverty line iPh  is the probability of household i falling below this 
bench mark.  
 
Therefore vulnerability or decrease in welfare ( )iv  can be defined as follows 
( )iiii XfvPvE α== )()(                                                                           (33) 
Where E ( iv ) denotes expected individual household vulnerability as a discrete variable, 
( )ii vP  denotes the probability of individual household vulnerability and iX  denotes 
variables that can be hypothesized to affect vulnerability, while α  are the coefficients to 
be estimated. By employing the model as specified above, the logit model can be applied 
to provide information about the determinants of vulnerability. The derivation of the logit 
model has already been done under section  
 
 
 
 115 
 
 
 
 116 
4.5.3 Results 
 
The following are the results of model 
Table 17: Determinants of household vulnerability 
 coefficient Z Marginal effects 
 
Vul.   





dx
dy
 
z 
Partc. .4244819 
(2.704296) 
0.16 .1056736 
(.66817) 
0.16 
Age -.1129655 
(.0751314) 
-1.50 -.0282291 
(.01877) 
-1.50 
Sizehh -.6975584*** 
(.200274) 
-3.48 -.1743137*** 
(05002) 
-3.49 
Sex -.4375553* 
(.2464972) 
-1.78 -.1093412* 
(.06159) 
-1.78 
Edu .3022687 
(.1877902) 
1.61 .0755343 
(.04693) 
1.61 
Borr -.159186 
(.1098029) 
-1.45 -0397792 
(.02744) 
-1.45 
Agesq .0009639 
(.0009692) 
0.99 .0002409 
(.00024) 
0.99 
Sizehhsq .0402057** 
(.0181941) 
2.21 .0100471** 
(.00454) 
2.21 
Edusq -.0218885** 
(.0101546) 
-2.261 -.0054697** 
(.00254) 
-2.16 
Amnt -.000356 
(.2739555) 
-0.00 -.000089 
(.06846) 
-0.00 
Constant 3.824171** 
(1.468682) 
2.260   
 
Key: *** Significant at 1 %, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
Standard errors are in parenthesis 
Source: Field data 
 
Where borr is the number of times that the household has borrowed, borr is zero for the 
control household and varies for the participating households.  
 
We fail to show that participation in JLL microfinance significantly increases 
vulnerability to poverty. We also fail to show that the number of times that a household 
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had borrowed from microfinance programs significantly reduces vulnerability to poverty. 
In the same note we also fail to show that access to loans through JLL significantly 
reduces vulnerability to poverty. However from this study we can conclusively say that 
vulnerability to poverty for both participants and non participants of JLL micro credit 
programs is determined by the size of household, sex of head of household and education 
level of head of household.  
 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
In the quantitative section it was possible to show that participation in joint liability 
lending microfinance programs in our study context is mainly influenced by household 
desperation for lack of other sources of a regular income. It was also established that joint 
liability lending programmes that are supposed to target the poorest in society does not 
reach the very poorest who do not have individual household assets. This is mainly due to 
peer discrimination in to the borrowing groups. There are policy implications if 
microfinance can not reach the very poor. There may be a need to re-examine the real 
issues contributing to household poverty and re evaluate how microfinance could be 
integrated with other poverty reduction policies to form a sustainable synergy.  
Dynamic incentives by microfinance institutions are very important in determining the 
loan sizes that households acquire. All else constant, it is a good sigh especially if 
households continued to get bigger credit after repayment of their earlier loans. But the 
problem in the study context is that households were involved in debt spirals as they 
sought more debts to conceal due loan instalments and end up acquiring bigger debts. 
The problem here may not be the loan incentives by the microfinance institution, but 
rather the same question of why the households needed the loans and the best way to 
meet the household welfare maximising point without necessarily going in to excess debt.  
 
Cross sectional analysis failed to show any significant positive impact of microfinance on 
household income. Though the study region had been plagued by five years drought and 
almost a complete failure of all agricultural activity, there had been lot of support coming 
from government a and donors. On the average, all households both participants and non 
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participants of microfinance programmes registered increases in household welfare. On 
controlling for selection biases and endogenity issues then the real increase in household 
income due to microfinance was insignificant; at least with cross sectional analysis. 
However after the inclusion of time dynamics in the analysis we were able to show 
significant impact (though weak) of microfinance on household income but only in the 
later period. This implied that it is possible for microfinance to have positive impacts on 
household incomes. Further positive impacts on household incomes would only come 
after persistence participation in the programmes.  In the initial period we failed to show 
significant negative impacts of microfinance on household income. This implied that 
some households may have experienced negative impacts, though on the overall this is 
not significant. The drop out rates of households from microfinance programmes was 33 
%. Negative impacts of microfinance are associated with high drop out rates from 
programmes by households.  
 
 The study also failed to show that on the overall participation in JLL microfinance 
significantly increases vulnerability to poverty, as implied by some earlier studies. In this 
study context microfinance did not have significant impacts in either increasing or 
reducing household vulnerability to poverty.   
 
The overall aim of the thesis was not to qualify or disqualify the use of microfinance for 
poverty reduction; but rather to enrich the knowledge base on how microfinance impacts 
on household income. The next chapter motivates future research in the area by 
proposing a theoretical propagation of how microfinance would fit in the bigger picture 
of rural development and poverty reduction.  The goal of the chapter is mainly to 
generate hypothesis; but empirical research in the future would be useful to generate 
conclusive information. The section is not only supposed to provoke further empirical 
research but also shape the direction of further research in to the role of micro 
entrepreneurships in rural development. Especially the section is aimed at provoking 
future research in to a sustainable role of microfinance and rural household poverty 
reduction.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE THEORETICAL ROLE OF MICRO ENTREPRENEURSHIPS IN RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF HOUSEHOLDS´ INCOME 
5.1  Introduction  
Microfinance for poverty reduction has currently become a global issue that has even 
been acknowledged with a Nobel Peace Prize. It is also interesting to note that the current 
global projection of the role of microfinance in poverty reduction has left the impression 
of some magic powers of poverty reduction through microfinance. For example, by use 
of inspiring stories about the effect of microfinance for a certain household; combined 
with immense publicity, policy makers and donors have unquestioningly come to believe 
that microfinance is the way out of poverty. So far research has not done much to 
demystify the role of microfinance and poverty reduction in any meaningful objective 
way. For example, researchers are still engaged on explaining particular specific results 
in specific contexts; for example: Some researchers would say that “microfinance has 
negative impacts on women’s welfare (Mayoux, 2002), or it had significant positive 
impacts in Bangladesh (Khandker, 2006), or it has had mixed results in Thailand 
(Coleman, 2006) and has had insignificant impacts in Kenya (Kiiru, 2007)”. This trend of 
research has continued to make the debate on microfinance extremely provocative and 
has the potential to make it difficulty for policy makers who would like to use research to 
guide further policy on microfinance.  
 
 The issue that needs to be stressed to policy makers is the fact that microfinance 
interventions do not happen in a “policy vacuum”. A microfinance intervention would 
have to not only interact with other pre-existing interventions but also the existing 
socioeconomic infrastructures. The realization that microfinance outcomes are potentially 
shaped by other pre existing or co existing interventions and socioeconomic 
infrastructure should make it clear that it is possible to have different results or even 
contradicting results for different microfinance intervention scenarios.  It is therefore 
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naïve to imagine that a couple of studies or anecdotes should be used to generalize the 
overall global impact of microfinance on poverty reduction.   
Arguments in favor of microfinance and poverty reduction emphasize that micro credit 
enhances entrepreneurship among poor households leading to an improvement on 
household incomes. Proponents also argue that the returns to micro enterprises are 
potentially high but are often impeded by lack of access to finance; and therefore access 
to credit by poor households could unleash a lot of potentials in household incomes. On 
the other hand skeptics question the assumptions underlying the supposed positive impact 
of microfinance on household incomes. In particular skeptics argue that all the 
assumptions underlying the supposedly good impact of microfinance may not hold in all 
places and therefore it is a serious fallacy to project microfinance as a global poverty 
reduction tool. These counter arguments have set the stage for an extremely polarized 
debate on microfinance that unfortunately overshadows the real issues in development 
research.  
 
There are serious questions that beg for answers if we were to move the microfinance 
debate forward. The first question would be: What other policy interventions are relevant 
for poverty reduction in a given scenario, the second question would be: What is the role 
of microfinance in poverty reduction, and the third question would be: How does 
microfinance relate to other existing policy intervention to build a synergy scenario for 
poverty reduction? These questions have got serious implications for policy. For example 
if microfinance is projected as more significant to poverty reduction than other policies 
then there is the danger that policy makers and donors may withdraw or reduce resources 
from other poverty reduction policies in to microfinance. The objective of this section of 
the thesis is not to answer these questions but rather to provoke future empirical research 
in to the broader issues of microfinance, rural development and poverty reduction.  
  
5.2 Economic Empowerment Through Informal Micro entrepreneurships?  
To jump-start the debate we could pose a pretty straight forward question: Is persistent 
increase in informal micro entrepreneurship in the rural areas a good sigh of the 
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economic empowerment of the households?9 This question may not necessarily have an 
obvious simple answer like yes or no. Many stakeholders would like to argue that as long 
as micro entrepreneurs create new businesses and new businesses in turn create jobs and 
intensify competition, and may even increase productivity through technological change, 
then high numbers of informal micro enterprises in the rural areas will thus translate 
directly into high levels of economic well being. The reality about persistent high levels 
of informal sole proprietorship in the rural areas and what it would theoretically imply in 
terms of economic well being could be much more complicated; at least in theory.   
 
Setting the stage….. 
Many rural economies in developing countries are in such a scenario that, the limit to 
productivity is inputs and not labour. Some studies have however shown that it is 
possible to have labour constraints to productivity even in areas with high population 
densities and small farm holdings (Kamau, 2006). How ever this type of result has been 
criticized for failing to account for the causal relationship in that critics think that it is the 
lack of inputs that would lead to low yields thus causing households to withdraw labour 
from unproductive farms; other than low yields being caused by labour constraints. 
Another characteristic of the rural setting in developing countries is high incidences of 
absolute poverty. 
In a strictly theoretical analysis it is possible to distinguish three major stages in 
transforming rural economies in developing countries from poverty stricken to relatively 
better off thorough the use of micro entrepreneurships. Initially, the households engage in 
subsistence farming, spending most of their expenditures on food; Sachs, (2005) 
describes such households as follows “farm households in the rural sector live pretty 
much in economic isolation. There are no roads within the villages, and there is no 
electricity. Households are mainly subsistence farmers consuming most of what they 
produce and commercial activity in the village is very low”. The first stage in our 
theoretical analysis is characterized by disease, hunger and general poverty.  
 
                                                 
9
 In modeling this rural economy I was greatly inspired by the works of ACS (2006) where he models 
entrepreneurship and economic growth. For a complete reference refer to the reference section. 
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If microfinance was to be used as the policy of intervention to boost micro 
entrepreneurship practice in the rural setting, each household chooses whether or not to 
accept microfinance depending on utility preferences. They accept microfinance if the 
utility of accepting microfinance exceeds the utility of not accepting. Depending on 
household characteristics and socioeconomic status of the household, there are two main 
reasons why microfinance and informal micro entrepreneurship becomes attractive to 
households in poor rural areas. The first reason has to do with the possibility to exploit a 
potentially good business opportunity given microfinance as a source of capital 
(opportunity–driven- entrepreneurship), while the other reason has to do with raising fast 
finances for household survival (survival- driven- financing). 
 
Households looking for fast cash for household survival would consume most of the 
small loans (or part of it). If a household uses all the loan funds in non productive 
household activities it may increase its chances of depleting household assets in the 
process of repayment. On the other hand not all “survival driven households” would 
consume all the loan money. Some households may invest part of it in some kind of 
informal micro enterprises. Usually many of the enterprises would be in over-exploited 
business ventures with marginal but fast returns (Kiiru and Mburu, 2007). The fast 
returns would enable the households cope with the short term loan repayment 
requirement of microfinance.  
 
Research has shown that whether a household gets in to either “survival or opportunity 
driven financing” mainly depends on the socioeconomic status of the household and (or) 
household entrepreneurship capability (Kiiru, Mburu 2007). Microfinance (which is in 
most cases supply driven) is likely to thrive where households are trapped in poverty for 
two major reasons. The first reason is that households are willing to comply with the 
strict credit conditions due to lack of alternatives. The second reason is that households 
are desperate to improve their wellbeing either through consumption smoothing or 
through small informal micro entrepreneurships to either survive or exploit a potentially 
good business venture.  
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……beneficial micro entrepreneurships… 
Theoretically it is rational to point that regardless of whether the household is involved in 
either “survival or opportunity- driven-entrepreneurship” real income improvements due 
to micro entrepreneurships will be realized depending on whether the following 
preconditions are met.  
(i) There is entrepreneurship capability within the household,  
(ii) There must be at least some reasonable infrastructure facilitating easy inter-
village and inter shopping-centre movements in order to improve local 
demand and provide a market for locally produced goods and services. 
Overall there must be adequate demand for goods and services from the 
informal micro entrepreneurships.   
(iii) The rate of return from micro enterprises must be greater than the rate of loan 
repayment.  
Although some studies have shown that there could be positive spill over effects due to 
microfinance (Khandker, 2006), it is naive to assume that spill over effects will always 
hold in all contexts and are able to reach all households. To this end it is advocated the 
use of conscious policy actions to improve the demand for goods and services among the 
very poor that may not directly benefit from market oriented intervention policies. Some 
researchers have suggested that social safety nets in kind (food for work) or “work for 
cash”10 or just simple charity would go along way in improving the overall demand for 
goods and services for all households in a rural setting (Morduch, 2000).  
 
……increasing or decreasing rate of sole proprietorship micro entrepreneurships?  
 
Theoretically if the forgoing preconditions are met then it is possible for the rural 
households to move in to another stage of their economic empowerment. It is rational to 
expect that ceteris paribus there is going to be enterprise growth in line with income 
maximization principle. Theoretically this stage should be marked by decreasing rates of 
household micro sole-proprietorships. There are reasons to expect that entrepreneurial 
                                                 
10
  Work for cash in this context may involve that local authorities pay some targeted households for doing 
some community work including making and maintaining local infrastructure or any other local projects 
that may not require big contractors.  
 124 
activity in terms of number of enterprises should decrease as rural economies pick up. To 
understand how this would happen, assume that individuals have different endowments 
of managerial ability. This would theoretically imply that as the rural economy becomes 
wealthier, the average enterprise size should increase as better managers run enterprises 
(Acs 2006). Average enterprise size is an increasing function of the wealth of the rural 
economy if capital and labor substitute. When capital and labor are substitutes, an 
increase in the capital stock increases the returns from working and decreases the returns 
from managing. In other words, marginal managers find they can earn more money while 
being employed by somebody else (Acs 2006). The overall expectations is that as the 
rural households as well as the overall rural economy becomes wealthier, with lower 
absolute poverty incidences then theoretically it is expected that the rate of people 
starting informal micro sole proprietorship decreases. This would imply that the number 
of informal micro sole entrepreneurships would decrease with time. 
 
There is also another explanation as to why it would be expected that the quantity of 
household sole proprietorships decrease with rural economic development. With more 
options of earning an income to enable the purchase of inputs then it would be possible 
for households to achieve more utility from agricultural activity or other economic 
activities where the household has a comparative advantage.  Households will only shift 
from micro entrepreneurship fully or partially to other economic activities and wage 
employment depending on returns and household welfare maximization principle.  
 
….overall welfare improvement…… 
The for going describes a diversified rural economy where there is a steady improvement 
in household welfare. Within this context, theoretically it is rational to expect low risks in 
terms of investments. It is also rational to theoretically expect capital inflow in to the 
rural setting given the theory of diminishing marginal utility.  The theory suggests the 
possibility to earn more returns from an extra unit of capital invested in a firm which 
already is undercapitalized.  This is derived form the strict concavity of the production 
function as illustrated in the figure below.  
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Figure 10:  The concavity of the production function illustrating Marginal returns to capital  
 
Is persistent increase in informal micro entrepreneurship in the rural areas a good 
sign of the economic empowerment of the households? 
At this point we are now ready to answer the question that we asked in the beginning: 
The discussion so far is in favor that “high concentrations of informal entrepreneurships 
within a locality may not necessarily be a sign of economic empowerment of the 
households but rather it could as well indicate a non performing economy, or that that 
there are many bottleneck to the formalisation of enterprises.”  
 
It is imperative for policy makers to distinguish when households are using micro-sole 
proprietorships to “adapt to poverty” as opposed to escaping poverty.  The for going 
discussion was mainly intended to provoke empirical research in to the issues of rural 
development and the role of microfinance. Research has to focus more in finding an 
effective and sustainable mix of policies that could work to alleviate rural poverty.  
 
 
Marginal return for 
undercapitalised firm 
Marginal return for 
high capital firm 
Output 
Capital 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The debate about microfinance still goes ahead and the United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF) has estimated that the global demand for microfinance 
ranges from 400 to 500 million of which only around 30 million are reported to have 
access to sustainable microfinance services in 2002. The number of customers that use 
microfinance has grown between 25 to 30% annually over the last five years (UNCDF 
2007), and the trend is expected to continue.  These statistics revoke mixed feelings 
among different stake holders. Skeptics are worried that the huge publicity accorded 
microfinance does not commensurate with empirical findings on the actual role of 
microfinance and poverty reduction. The fear for the skeptics is that donors and policy 
makers may withdraw resources from other poverty alleviation policies in favor of 
microfinance; an action that has been feared to be a possible policy blunder especially if 
there is no proven history of a strong role of microfinance in poverty alleviation.   In 
particular it has been argued that the demand for micro credit is supply driven mainly by 
donors and NGOs and that micro credit is likely to thrive in areas where there is high 
population growth rates and high levels of poverty. In this light, skeptics argue that “the 
fact that more and more households are embracing microfinance should not be interpreted 
to mean that they are improving their welfare; especially given that no study so far has 
shown any strong and robust impact of microfinance on poverty reduction”.  
 
In conclusion to this study it is argued that there is a role for microfinance as a poverty 
reduction policy tool. However it is emphasized that if microfinance is chosen as an 
intervention policy for poverty reduction there is need to set clear objectives for the 
indicators of economic empowerment for the people. More importantly the ability of 
households to begin informal sole micro entrepreneurships should not be assumed to be 
adequate for the improvement of household income. There is need to create a policy 
framework to spur growth in the enterprises as well as the rural economy as a whole 
through the creation of employment opportunities and an increment in the agricultural 
output. To achieve such objectives more than one policy intervention may be required. In 
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essence this calls for both private (microfinance) and public partnerships to create the 
environment where such poverty reduction objectives could be realized. Overall there is 
need to have a sustainable mix of both market and non market policy interventions for 
poverty reduction if the impacts due to an intervention policy are to be sustainable. This 
is so because the structure of markets in which households operate is critical in shaping 
household response to exogenous policy changes. The existing market structure is also 
very important in determining the impact of policy interventions on the target output. 
 
 
 
